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ABSTRACT  
 
Since 1993, the United Nations has promoted national human rights institutions (NHRIs); these 
have spread to almost 120 countries. We assess what makes NHRIs effective, using quantitative 
and qualitative methods. We find that formal institutional safeguards contribute greatly to NHRI 
efficacy even in authoritarian and transition regimes. Complaint-handling mandates are 
particularly useful because they help NHRIs build broad bases of support. Our findings show 
how international organizations can wield great influence with soft tools such as 
recommendations and peer-review mechanisms. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Human rights treaties articulate ambitious international standards, but in many parts of 
the world, domestic practices lag far behind. In the post-World War II period, the vast majority 
of governments across the world adopted the language of fundamental rights;1 signed and ratified 
key international human rights treaties;2 incorporated equality provisions in their constitutions;3 
and developed domestic jurisprudence giving particular shape to these rights. However, human 
rights practices on the ground are at best uneven.4 
To bridge the gulf between international law and domestic practices, in the early 1990s, 
the United Nations started promoting National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs), independent 
national agencies specifically designed to protect and promote human rights.5 The UN defines an 
NHRI very broadly, as “a body which is established by a Government under the constitution, or 
by law or decree, the functions of which are specifically designed in terms of the promotion and 
protection of human rights.”6 The 1991 Paris Principles, a UN General Assembly resolution 
calling on all states to adopt an NHRI, provided a template for NHRI design and precipitated 
institutional reforms in dozens of countries.7 NHRIs spread very rapidly across diverse political 
systems, from an estimated twenty NHRIs in 1990 to approximately 121 active NHRIs in 2017, 
with more on the way.8 
NHRIs are undoubtedly an important example of global administrative law and 
networked regulation more generally.9 As NHRIs take center stage as a possible “missing link” 
in a transnational human rights regime, increasing attention is being paid to how they actually 
work, and crucially, when and why they matter.10 Pioneering work by practitioners,11 
                                                 
1 See JOHN BOLI & GEORGE M. THOMAS, CONSTRUCTING WORLD CULTURE: INTERNATIONAL 
NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS SINCE 1875 (1999). 
2 BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS 36–54 
(2009). 
3 See Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg & Beth A. Simmons, Getting to Rights: Treaty Ratification, Constitutional 
Convergence, and Human Rights Practice, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 61 (2013); Francisco O. Ramirez, Yasemin Soysal 
& Suzanne Shanahan, The Changing Logic of Political Citizenship: Cross-National Acquisition of Women’s 
Suffrage Rights, 1890 to 1990, 62 AM. SOC. REV. 735 (1997). 
4 See, e.g., Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Justice Lost! The Failure of International Human 
Rights Law to Matter Where Needed Most, 44 J. PEACE RES. 407 (2007); Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights 
Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935 (2002); Christopher J. Fariss, Respect for Human Rights Has 
Improved Over Time: Modeling the Changing Standard of Accountability, 108 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 297 (2014); Ryan 
Goodman & Derek Jinks, Measuring the Effects of Human Rights Treaties, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 171 (2003). 
5 U.N. CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS: A HANDBOOK ON THE 
ESTABLISHMENT AND STRENGTHENING OF NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS FOR THE PROMOTION AND 
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, U.N. SALES NO. E.95.XIV.2 (1995). 
6 Id., para 39.  
7 See Katerina Linos & Thomas Pegram, The Language of Compromise in International Agreements, 70 INT’L 
ORG. 587 (2016).  
8 See Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI), ICC Accreditation, Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), at 
http://nhri.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/GANHRIAccreditation/Pages/default.aspx; see also Katerina Linos & Tom 
Pegram, Architects of Their Own Making: National Human Rights Institutions and the United Nations, 38 HUM. 
RTS. Q. 1109, 1110 (2016). 
9 See Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15–61 (2005). 
10 Linos & Pegram, The Language of Compromise, supra note 7 at 597–605. 
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interventions by international non-governmental organizations (INGOs),12 recent scholarly 
contributions,13 and careful case study work on individual cases14 all suggest that at least some 
NHRIs are contributing significantly to the improvement of human rights in their countries. 
NHRIs have assisted torture victims in seeking redress before domestic and international courts, 
stewarded truth and reconciliation processes, improved legislation protecting vulnerable groups, 
mediated social conflicts, and mobilized public opinion on environmental rights.15 Some 
governments invested significant resources in building these institutions; case studies suggest 
that some employ hundreds of staff members, have dozens of regional offices, and operate on 
multimillion dollar annual budgets.16 Indeed, the one existing large-N study of NHRIs also offers 
reason for hope, as it concludes that adopting an NHRI reduces physical integrity violations.17 
But in other countries, there are significant concerns that states built “sham” NHRIs in response 
to international pressure, without granting them the powers to carry out their monitoring tasks.18 
To understand what makes some NHRIs particularly effective, and others less so, we start 
by focusing on formal institutional design safeguards. These formal safeguards include 
provisions intended to guarantee the body’s independence (e.g., provisions for the appointment 
and removal of NHRI leaders), as well as provisions outlining specific tasks that fall within an 
NHRI’s mandate (e.g., provisions that the NHRI can visit prisons or receive individual 
complaints). We term these features “safeguards” because they can help protect an active NHRI 
from efforts to change its leadership or structure, as well as from allegations that it exceeded its 
mandate. We term these features “formal” because they are found in writing in legal 
                                                                                                                                                             
11 See, e.g., RICHARD CARVER, PERFORMANCE & LEGITIMACY: NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS (2001) 
[hereinafter CARVER 2001]; RICHARD CARVER, ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
INSTITUTIONS (2005) [hereinafter CARVER 2005]; BRIAN BURDEKIN & JASON NAUM, NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
INSTITUTIONS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION (2007). 
12 Amnesty International, NHRIs: Recommendations for Effective Protection and Promotion of Human Rights, 
AI Index: IOR 40/007/2001 (Oct. 2001), available at 
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/128000/ior400072001en.pdf. 
13 HUMAN RIGHTS, STATE COMPLIANCE, AND SOCIAL CHANGE: ASSESSING NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
INSTITUTIONS (Ryan Goodman & Thomas Pegram eds., 2012); SONIA CARDENAS, CHAINS OF JUSTICE: THE GLOBAL 
RISE OF STATE INSTITUTIONS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (2014); Sarah Spencer & Colin Harvey, Context, Institution or 
Accountability? Exploring the Factors that Shape the Performance of National Human Rights and Equality Bodies, 
42 POL. & POLITICS 89–107 (2014). 
14 See Shedrack C. Agbakwa & O.C. Okafor, On Legalism, Popular Agency and ‘Voices of Suffering’: The 
Nigerian National Human Rights Commission in Context, 24 HUM. RTS. Q. 662 (2002); Fredrik Uggla, The 
Ombudsman in Latin America, 36 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 423 (2004); Pilar Domingo, Weak Courts, Rights and Legal 
Mobilization in Bolivia, in COURTS AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: AN INSTITUTIONAL 
VOICE FOR THE POOR? 233 (Roberto Gargarella, Pilar Domingo & Theunis Roux eds., 2006); Jodi Finkel, 
Explaining the Failure of Mexico’s National Commission of Human Rights (Ombudsman’s Office) After 
Democratization: Elections, Incentives, and Unaccountability in the Mexican Senate, 13 HUM. RTS, REV. 473 
(2012). 
15 See Agbakwa & Okafor, supra note 14; Domingo, supra note 14; Evgeny Finkel, The Authoritarian 
Advantage of Horizontal Accountability: Ombudsmen in Poland and Russia, 44 COMP. POL. 291 (2012).  
16 See Thomas Pegram, National Human Rights Institutions in Latin America: Politics and Institutionalization, 
in HUMAN RIGHTS, STATE COMPLIANCE, AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 13, at 210, 210–40.  
17 See Wade M. Cole & Francisco O. Ramirez, Conditional Decoupling: Assessing the Impact of National 
Human Rights Institutions, 1981 to 2004, 78 AM. SOC. REV. 702 (2013). 
18 SIMMONS, supra note 2; Human Rights Watch, Protectors or Pretenders? Government Human Rights 
Commissions in Africa 14 (Jan. 1, 2001); CARVER 2001, supra note 11 at 59–63; Thomas Pegram & Ryan Goodman, 
Introduction: National Human Rights Institutions, State Conformity, and Social Change, in HUMAN RIGHTS, STATE 
COMPLIANCE, AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 13, at 1, 18.  
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documents—typically in an NHRI’s charter, which can in turn form part of a national 
constitution, legislation, or executive decree. We thus contrast formal safeguards with informal 
arrangements, oral agreements, and societal norms that could also contribute to institutional 
effectiveness. Based on extensive consultation with scholars and practitioners, we compiled a list 
of twenty-two such features that could contribute to NHRI effectiveness, and outline how each 
could operate in theory in Part I below. 
We focus on formal design because a large literature in administrative law suggests that 
agencies with formal safeguards are often more effective than agencies that lack them. 
Administrative law scholarship suggests that politically independent bodies can potentially 
facilitate expert and nonpartisan decision making, stabilize policymaking against electoral cycle 
volatility, and protect politically disadvantaged minorities.19 In addition, institutional design 
safeguards provide the international community—the principal backer of NHRIs—with an 
important lever of influence. The UN can neither directly appoint NHRI staff members nor 
contribute significantly to NHRI budgets, but the UN has strongly recommended specific 
institutional safeguards, and has granted speaking rights and special status to select NHRIs.20 
Finally, NHRI practitioners suggest and case study authors argue that certain configurations of 
safeguards are critical to the success of these bodies.21 
That said, we need to learn a great deal more about which institutional design rules will 
matter, and under what circumstances. After all, designing effective institutions is challenging in 
any context; the compliance gap separating formal rules from their implementation on the 
ground has motivated a vast institutional literature across law, political science, sociology, and 
economics.22 The gap between formal design choices and organizational effectiveness could be 
especially severe in the human rights context. This is because NHRIs are intended to work as 
checks on the government that set them up; indeed, many countries set up NHRIs in response to 
severe international criticism of their human rights practices, and authoritarian leaders might be 
reluctant to set up too strong a monitoring body.23 A main theoretical contribution of our project 
is to marry general administrative law theories—often developed with a focus on industrialized 
                                                 
19 See DAVID E. LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN: POLITICAL INSULATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY 1946–1997 (2003); David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Why 
Who What Matters: Governmental Design and Agency Performance, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1446 (2014); STEPHAN 
S. HAGGARD & ROBERT KAUFMAN, THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT: INTERNATIONAL CONSTRAINTS, 
DISTRIBUTIVE CONFLICTS AND THE STATE (1992); Matthew McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, 
Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangement and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 
VA. L. REV. 431 (1989); Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. 
L. REV. 1131 (2012). 
20 More specifically, “A” status National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) have speaking rights within the 
Human Rights Council; an NHRI peer review network, the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions 
(GANHRI) awards “A” status. See infra Part II.A.1. for details. See also Linos & Pegram, The Language of 
Compromise, supra note 7 (indicating how the UN Paris Principles shaped the establishment of dozens of NHRIs ) 
and Linos & Pegram, Architects of Their Own Making, supra note 8 (explaining how the UN has included NHRIs in 
treaty mechanisms).  
21 CARVER 2001, supra note 11, at 111–12. 
22See, e.g., Terry M. Moe, The New Economics of Organization, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 739 (1984); Kingsbury, 
Krisch & Stewart, supra note 9; Paul Pierson, Not Just What, but When: Timing and Sequence in Political 
Processes, 14 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 72 (2000); Steven Levitsky & María Victoria Murillo, Variation in Institutional 
Strength, 12 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 115 (2009).  
23 See Dongwook Kim, International Nongovernmental Organizations and the Global Diffusion of National 
Human Rights Institutions, 67 INT’L ORG. 505 (2013). 
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settings—with specific intuitions from the NHRI community, and to develop and test a range of 
theoretical conjectures. 
In Part I, we develop three interconnected theoretical arguments, about whether, when, 
and why institutional safeguards matter. To develop theoretical claims, we draw heavily on the 
administrative law and politics literature, which is well-developed for industrialized settings, and 
in particular the United States, and build on it to explain how particular claims might or might 
not apply to the human rights setting in diverse types of countries. First, we theorize that NHRIs 
with more independence guarantees, with a broader formal mandate—including investigatory 
and promotional powers—and with greater inclusiveness provisions are more effective than 
those that lack these safeguards. Our second hypothesis is that context matters: formal 
institutional design is most likely to translate directly to improved outcomes in stable 
democracies that follow the rule of law, but should still influence decisions in authoritarian and 
transition regimes. Third, we try to explore theoretically why institutional design should matter 
for NHRI effectiveness, even in such challenging regime settings. We theorize that institutional 
design safeguards could influence NHRI priority-setting and staffing choices, shape modes of 
resistance toward independent agencies tasked with holding government to account, and 
contribute to positive (or negative) feedback loops, linking the NHRI to civil society and the 
media over time. 
We then explore these claims empirically to understand variation in the effectiveness of 
NHRIs around the world. To offer the first systematic assessment of NHRI effectiveness, we 
triangulate across three types of measures. To assess NHRI effectiveness quantitatively, we start 
with the grade awarded to NHRIs by an NHRI peer review network. We supplement this grade 
with original expert survey data, in which thirty-six experts from around the world assessed the 
effectiveness of NHRIs with which they were familiar. Following past best practice in 
scholarship on administrative agencies,24 both our quantitative measures focus on the agency 
itself, rather than capturing country-level human rights performance that could be attributed to 
the executive, the legislature or the judiciary, among others. We supplement these aggregate 
measures of effectiveness with detailed qualitative case studies that can separate out different 
dimensions of agency effectiveness, by assessing, for instance, whether an NHRI was effective at 
resolving individual complaints but less effective at triggering legislative change, or perhaps 
attracted extensive publicity to certain human rights issues while shying away from matters the 
executive considered sensitive. Each of these measures has important advantages and limitations, 
which we develop below. Nevertheless, by collecting data that is much more extensive than prior 
work in comparative administrative law, and by triangulating across different types of source 
materials, we make significant progress on the question of agency effectiveness. 
In Part II, we present quantitative analyses. To conduct quantitative analyses, we 
compiled an original dataset of twenty-two institutional design features of NHRIs in 107 
countries. This reflects significant improvement on prior quantitative work that compares the 
presence of an NHRI to the absence of such a body, but has less to say about different types of 
NHRIs.25  
In Part III, we assemble our case study evidence to assess the plausibility of various 
causal propositions and probe inductively the impact of specific design mechanisms on NHRI 
                                                 
24 Chris Hanretty & Christel Koop, Political Independence, Accountability, and the Quality of Regulatory 
Decision-Making, COMP. POL. STUD. (first pub. March 28, 2017), available at 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0010414017695329. 
25 See id.; Cole & Ramirez, supra note 17. 
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behavior and outcomes.26 To assess the importance of investigatory safeguards we compare 
Peru’s NHRI, which has such mechanisms, with Chile’s NHRI, which lacks such safeguards. To 
assess the importance of promotional safeguards, we compare Malaysia’s NHRI which has this 
formal mandate, to the Philippine NHRI, which lacks many of these safeguards. Our case studies 
draw on over a decade of fieldwork, and are built on a wealth of original documentary sources 
and evidence. In addition, they are structured to follow best practices in qualitative methodology 
on case selection and within case analysis. 
In both our quantitative and qualitative analyses, we find that NHRIs with formal 
safeguards are more effective than those that lack these features, especially among democratic 
states. We find that even in transitional and authoritarian settings, formal safeguards can have 
important intermediate effects: guiding initial NHRI staffing and activity choices, shaping the 
kinds of resistance that outspoken NHRIs are likely to confront, and helping to build media and 
societal support over time. In particular, NHRIs with strong investigatory capabilities, starting 
with the ability to receive and process individual complaints, are more effective than NHRIs 
without these features. In the short term, complaint-handling allows the NHRI to help address 
individuals’ issues, while in the longer term, complaint-handling powers allow NHRIs to build 
community support based on their public profile as accessible and accountable institutions, and 
thus resist budget cuts and other challenges.  
As we outline in our conclusion, these findings have important implications for many 
debates. We contribute to administrative law debates by exploring when and why formal 
institutional design corresponds to improved outcomes, even in developing countries. We show 
that formal mandates—which tend to be relatively stable over time—inform both the internal 
workings of these agencies, as well as how they relate to their external political and institutional 
environment.27 Over time, initially empowered NHRIs can more easily build coalitions and 
positive feedback cycles. We also contribute to human rights debates, by showing how NHRIs 
can serve as the missing link connecting ambitious international standards with practices on the 
ground across diverse regime settings. More specifically, we show that individual complaint-
handling powers—a controversial issue within the NHRI community—are linked to 
organizational effectiveness in a broad range of settings. We also help advance international law 
methodology, by combining cutting-edge quantitative and qualitative techniques, and showing 
how interviews and expert surveys can be effectively incorporated into legal scholarship. Finally, 
we contribute to debates on international organization efficacy, demonstrating how some of the 
limited levers that the United Nations has at its disposal—General Assembly resolutions, peer 
review, and participation rights—can translate into unexpected policy shifts at the national level. 
 
I. THEORETICAL CONJECTURES ON NHRI EFFECTIVENESS 
 
We seek to address two interrelated questions: whether NHRI institutional design 
matters, and if so, how. In this section, we develop theoretical claims; we turn to their empirical 
testing in Parts II and III. Whether, when, and why formal design matters are core questions for 
administrative law and public administration scholarship. Bureaucratic independence and 
                                                 
26 See ALEXANDER L. GEORGE & ANDREW BENNETT, CASE STUDIES AND THEORY DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOCIAL 
SCIENCES (2005). 
27 For a similar inquiry into the impact of external environmental factors on the variable authority of 
international courts see Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer & Mikael Rask Madsen, How Context Shapes the 
Authority of International Courts, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (2016). 
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autonomy are emphasized in this scholarship. Formal design features intended to increase 
autonomy include provisions that make it hard to reverse agency decisions, replace agency 
personnel, and curtail the agency’s mandate.28 However, much of this research agenda has 
principally focused on the United States and on industrialized world bureaucratic structures, so it 
is important to carefully consider how to adapt theories for the rest of the world. 
Case studies of NHRIs yield a generally positive, but mixed picture, of these bodies’ 
contributions. The one existing large-N study of NHRI effects also offers us some optimism: it 
finds that countries which adopted NHRIs have seen a persistent improvement in their physical 
integrity outcomes.29 We build on this important work by analyzing NHRI institutional design in 
much greater detail. Qualitative case studies suggest formal institutional design safeguards 
matter both in stable democracies, and in less democratic regimes. For example, the fact that the 
British Equality and Human Rights Commission was set up by legislation (rather than executive 
decree) helped ward off credible threats of dissolution in 2012 by a government which viewed it 
as a “relic of the past.”30 In Russia, when an independent and effective ombudsman confronted 
former President Boris Yeltsin over violations in Chechnya, the office persisted (although the 
head of the office was replaced), in part because the office was constitutionally entrenched.31 
NHRIs are organized in highly diverse ways. Some are highly pluralistic, made up of 
multi-member commissions, while others are unitary, composed of a single ombudsman head. 
Some NHRIs handle complaints and have robust investigative powers, some serve principally an 
advisory function to the legislative and executive branches and others mainly conduct research. 
Some NHRIs have legal prerogatives, some have none at all. How, if at all, do these differences 
matter?  
In the paragraphs that follow, we draw on general administrative law scholarship that 
emphasizes agency independence as a key prerequisite for effectiveness. We take general 
theoretical concepts developed primarily for industrialized contexts, and combine them with 
NHRI-specific literature, to develop testable hypotheses about how safeguards such as 
constitutional or legislative entrenchment, dismissal protections, immunity, and more could 
make an NHRI more effective. We then continue with conjectures that stem from more 
specialized literatures, to explain how investigatory functions, promotional capacities, and 
inclusion safeguards could also contribute to NHRI effectiveness. We focus especially on 
investigatory powers, including complaint-handling, as these powers continue to animate much 
debate within the NHRI community. Because ours is the first study to systematically assess a 
very broad range of NHRI safeguards around the world, we start with general theoretical claims, 
and see if they hold true across diverse countries, using cross-country regressions. We then turn 
to case studies, to explore how different formal design attributes work in different contexts.  
 
A. Independence 
 
                                                 
28 See DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY (2001); ABRAHAM L. NEWMAN, 
PROTECTORS OF PRIVACY. REGULATING PERSONAL DATA IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2008); Jacob E. Gersen, 
Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201 (2007). 
29 Cole & Ramirez, supra note 17 at 714–15. 
30 Randeep Ramesh, Equality and Human Rights Commission Has Workforce Halved, GUARDIAN (May 15, 
2012), at https://www.theguardian.com/society/2012/may/15/equality-human-rights-commission-cuts. 
31 Evgeny Finkel, The Authoritarian Advantage of Horizontal Accountability: Ombudsmen in Poland and 
Russia, 44 COMP. POL. 291, 304 (2012). 
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The public administration and administrative law literature provides various reasons why, 
subject to qualification, one might want independent agencies. Scholars have highlighted how 
enacting coalitions can grant authority to independent agencies to “lock-in” politics and prevent 
undesirable policy drift.32 Echoing the desire to insulate agencies from unwanted interference, 
scholars asserts that independence can ensure more expert and impartial decision-making.33 
Particular attention has been paid to protection from political capture by organized interests.34 
Rachel Barkow specifies a raft of design elements that could influence capture, including an 
agency’s funding source, personnel restrictions, the rule relationships between the agency and 
other agencies, and political resources. 35 At the same time, however, public administration 
scholarship also highlights the hazards of insufficient oversight of public agencies36 and the 
ambiguous virtues of a bureaucracy increasingly insulated from presidential control.37 
Moreover, in moving away from industrialized countries, to far more adverse political 
and security contexts, one could hypothesize that strong ties to the executive, and the 
concomitant lack of independence, might be paramount for effective NHRI operations. A 
number of NHRIs have been activated under autocratic conditions or in the midst of armed 
conflict. Under such conditions, close ties to the executive may be advantageous. As John 
Hatchard observed in Africa over three decades ago, “[u]nless the ombudsman is seen to have 
the blessing of the head of state it may well be very difficult for him to operate effectively.”38 
Close ties to the executive might be especially important in the highly vertical political structures 
of presidential regimes in Latin America and Africa.39 Of course, an NHRI with close ties to the 
executive might also be fatally compromised and serve as a proxy for—rather than a check on—
the government. 
 As the preceding discussion highlights, independence is a contentious issue informing the 
design of NHRIs.40 For this reason, we think it especially important to investigate this dimension 
empirically. According to Richard Carver, NHRI independence could be influenced by multiple 
factors, including “statutory basis, appointment process, criteria for membership, term of office, 
conflict of interest provisions, remuneration, immunities enjoyed by institution members, 
whether or not they can receive direct instruction from the government, and the procedure for 
removal of a member.”41 In our study, we have been able to collect systematic data on five of 
these features, which we list below. Each of these formal design safeguards, could, according to 
the administrative law literature, contribute to agency independence.  
                                                 
32 See Matthew McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: 
Administrative Arrangement and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 443 (1989). 
33 See generally HAGGARD & KAUFMAN, supra note 19. 
34 See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1971). 
35 See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 
15, 42–64 (2010). 
36 See Arjen Boin & Robert E. Goodin, Institutionalizing Upstarts: The Demons of Deinstitutionalization and 
the Benefits of Recalcitrance, 42 ACTA POLITICA 40 (2007). 
37 See David E. Lewis, The Adverse Consequences of the Politics of Agency Design for Presidential 
Management in the United States: The Relative Durability of Insulated Agencies, 34 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 377 (2004). 
38 John Hatchard, The Institution of the Ombudsman in Africa with Special Reference to Zimbabwe, 35 INT’L & 
COMP. L. Q. 255, 258 (1986). 
39 See Scott Mainwaring, Presidentialism in Latin America, 25 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 157 (1990). 
40 See Katrien Meuwissen, NHRIs and the State: New and Independent Actors in the Multi-layered Human 
Rights System?, 15 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 441–84 (2015). 
41 Richard Carver, Measuring the Impact and Development Effectiveness of National Human Rights Institutions: 
A Proposed Framework for Evaluation, 22, UNDP, Bratislava Regional Ctr. (Feb. 2014) (on file with authors).  
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Independence 
Safeguards 
Rationale 
Constitutional or  
Legislative Status 
Establishment by constitution or legislation makes NHRI charter 
harder to amend, and NHRI more stable 
No Dismissal Without 
Cause 
Dismissal only for good cause helps safeguard NHRI independence  
Immunity 
Immunity from prosecution helps safeguard the independence of 
NHRI leaders 
No Government 
Representation 
Government representatives may compromise NHRI autonomy and 
independence 
Not Designated by 
Executive 
NHRI officials appointed by the executive may have limited 
independence.  
 
B. Investigatory Powers 
 
While the administrative law literature examines agency independence in significant 
depth, there is much less general theorization on investigatory powers, in part because these vary 
dramatically from issue area to issue area and from country to country. Nevertheless, significant 
variation among NHRIs on investigatory powers, and extensive practitioner debate leads us to 
develop theoretical conjectures about them. There are two NHRI archetypes: the ombudsman 
and the commission model. The ombudsman model typically involves a single appointee, 
empowered to investigate grievances of individual citizens against the administration. In 
contrast, a human rights commission is typically composed of multiple commissioners, including 
civil society representatives, and often conducts research on broad human rights situations and 
advises on legislation. Because investigatory powers, especially complaint-handling powers, are 
often found in NHRIs that follow the ombudsman model, but not in NHRIs that follow the 
commission model, they are controversial in the NHRI community. 
Few design features provoke as much debate as complaint-handling powers. The UN 
standards on NHRI design (the “Paris Principles”) leave complaint-handling as an optional 
feature. However, many NHRI practitioners argue that this provision should be mandatory.42 
They contend that this provision directly enables an NHRI to enhance accessible and effective 
remedies (especially for those most vulnerable), uncover structural or systematic rights 
violations, and facilitate complaints by third parties on behalf of vulnerable groups. It also 
provides for a direct (and gratis) interface between the NHRI and the citizen, enhancing 
accessibility and potentially creating positive reputational feedback effects. Such an attribute is 
held to be particularly significant in settings where state structures are widely viewed as 
ineffective, dysfunctional and inaccessible. For example, the South African NHRI has linked 
complaint-handling to opening a door to securing redress, advancing constitutional 
jurisprudence, and legitimizing the amicus function of the office in ground-breaking cases, 
                                                 
42 Interview with Brian Burdekin, former Special Adviser on National Institutions to the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (1995–2003) (Mar. 30, 2012). 
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including the Grootboom decision by the South African Constitutional Court which ruled that the 
government was under an obligation to provide adequate housing.43 
Nevertheless, other experts and practitioners strongly question this view. A prominent 
line of critique highlights the risks incumbent to complaint-handling, including capacity overload 
and loss of strategic focus on priority human rights issues.44 NHRIs often struggle to balance a 
statutory obligation to process all complaints received with a more strategic focus on the most 
urgent human rights issues.45 Resource concentration on complaint-handling diverts capacity 
away from effective monitoring of agencies and government operations that would reveal other 
important rights concerns. Carver concludes that “[t]he ombudsman model, driven as it is by 
individual complaints from members of the public, may not be the most effective way of tackling 
systemic human rights problems.”46 For example, most of the complaints received by the 
Ghanaian office concern employment disputes by public servants.47 The Ugandan NHRI has also 
been criticized for pursuing individual complaints to the exclusion of more urgent human rights 
issues afflicting the country.48  
 In short, because there is substantial debate on the impact of investigatory powers, and 
complaint-handling in particular, this question is a ripe one for empirical analysis. In the table 
below, we list some investigatory powers that are often found in NHRIs, as well as an 
enforcement prerogative that is quite rare, but characterizes some unusually powerful bodies.49 
We have been able to collect data on each of these dimensions of investigatory functions. 
 
Investigatory 
Safeguards 
Rationale 
Power to Investigate 
When NHRI can investigate on its own initiative, it can have 
proactive role, in contrast to reactive role of judiciary 
Can Compel Evidence 
or Testimony 
Strengthens investigation and complaint-handling powers 
Security Facilities 
The explicit power to oversee prisons allows NHRIs to monitor a 
site of potentially grave human rights violations 
Can Refer Complaints Facilitates access of vulnerable groups to courts 
Individuals’ 
Complaints 
Power to hear individual complaints offers individuals direct access 
to NHRI 
                                                 
43 The SOUTH AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, CRITICALLY REFLECTING ON AN INSTITUTIONAL JOURNEY 
2002–2009, at 4 (2009), available at http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/critically_reflecting_report.pdf.  
44 See Carver, Measuring the Impact, supra note 41.  
45 See CARVER 2005, supra note 11.  
46 Richard Carver, National Human Rights Institutions in Central and Eastern Europe: The Ombudsman as 
Agent of International Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS, STATE COMPLIANCE, AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 13, at 181, 
200. 
47 See Naefa Khan, The Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice in Ghana: Working in the 
Micro and Around the Macro, in NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS IN AFRICA. DEFENDERS OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS, MANAGERS OF CONFLICT, BUILDERS OF PEACE? 80 (Michelle Parlevliet, Guy Lamb & Victoria Maloka 
eds., 2005). 
48 Peter Rosenblum, Tainted Origins and Uncertain Outcomes: Evaluating NHRIs, in HUMAN RIGHTS, STATE 
COMPLIANCE, AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 13, at 297, 313.  
49 The most prominent example of judicial NHRIs are the Ghanaian, Kenyan, Ugandan, and Sierra Leonean 
offices which, to varying degrees, have court-like powers. 
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Investigatory 
Safeguards 
Rationale 
Enforcement Powers 
Enforceable remedies help speed up implementation of any NHRI 
decisions  
 
C. Promotional Functions 
 
As Barkow notes, “[o]ne of the most powerful weapons policy makers can give agencies 
is the ability to generate and disseminate information . . . .”50 In the NHRI context, such powers 
are generally termed “promotional powers.” Advocates for the commission model emphasize 
that NHRIs can effectively focus attention on human rights problems through their promotion 
work. For example, when an NHRI’s mandate includes advising on legislation, the NHRI can 
criticize proposals with a view to securing their amendment, expansion, or withdrawal.51 Of 
course, the legislature would be under no obligation to defer to the NHRI’s judgment. However, 
they may find it difficult to ignore the views of the NHRI when it is grounded in expert legal 
analysis and reinforced by supportive domestic and international constituencies.  
Similarly, an NHRI’s annual report could serve as a focal point, and shed (unwelcome) 
attention on a government’s human rights practices. In the table below, we list three promotional 
safeguards commonly found in NHRIs.  
 
Promotion 
Safeguards 
Rationale 
Advise on Legislation 
Helps make domestic legislation consistent with human rights 
standards 
Annual Report Helps focus public opinion on country’s human rights situation 
Education and  
Promotion 
Promotes human rights among government agencies, educational 
institutions, and civil society 
 
D. Inclusiveness 
 
Administrative law debates focus extensively on whether agencies should have broad or 
narrow mandates.52 NHRIs that have a broad mandate, and can receive inputs from domestic 
civil society and from international bodies, are sometimes considered more effective than NHRIs 
that have a narrower scope. For example, across a wide range of commonwealth countries, the 
ability of NHRIs to review claims concerning social and economic rights is widely considered a 
major advantage, because courts in these jurisdictions are often closed to such claims. For 
example, the Australian NHRIs’ reports and recommendations on homeless children in 1989 and 
                                                 
50 Barkow, supra note 35 at 59. 
51 Julie Mertus, Evaluating NHRIs: Considering Structure, Mandate, and Impact, in HUMAN RIGHTS, STATE 
COMPLIANCE, AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 13, at 74, 84–86.  
52 See Matthew McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of 
Political Control, 3 J. L., ECON., & ORG. 243 (1987); Tamar Gutner, Explaining the Gaps Between Mandate and 
Performance: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform, 5 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 10 (2005); Young 
Han Chun & Hal G. Rainey, Goal Ambiguity in US Federal Agencies, 15 J. PUB. ADMIN., RES., & THEORY 1 (2005); 
Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 41 (1986). 
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the mentally ill in 1993 have been widely acknowledged as changing the protection landscape in 
Australia, and have been credited with changing laws, policies, programs and funding, as well as 
raising community awareness.53 The importance of a broad formal mandate can also be seen 
when political leaders restrict it. This happened in the widely criticized reform of the Mexican 
NHRI in 1992 when the NHRI was prohibited from intervening in electoral or labor issues.54 
In addition to a broad mandate, inputs from diverse individuals and groups, both 
domestic and international, could help an NHRI identify and address pressing needs. Below are 
four relatively common NHRI institutional safeguards that provide for inclusiveness, and thus 
potentially affect efficacy. 
 
Inclusiveness 
safeguards 
Rationale 
Broad Rights 
Mandate 
Protects human rights broadly, including social, economic, and 
cultural rights 
Harmonize 
International Human 
Rights Law 
Allows NHRI to help harmonize domestic law with international 
human rights standards 
Engage with 
International 
Organizations 
Helps connect NHRI to international organizations 
Civil Society 
Representation 
Civil society representatives facilitate contact with diverse societal 
groups.  
 
While NHRIs have not been extensively studied, literatures on courts, legislatures, 
constitutions, and other institutions suggest that formal safeguards matter more in democratic 
regimes.55 In democratic states, the public can hold their elected leaders to account for human 
rights abuses and thus the political elite have a greater incentive to support, rather than 
undermine, the NHRI’s effectiveness. Furthermore, autocratic regimes may be able to mitigate 
the domestic and international repercussions of human rights violations by suppressing 
incriminating information. In contrast, the civil liberties upheld by democratic states make it 
much more difficult for democratic leaders to mitigate the political fallout from human rights 
violations committed by state agents. By studying democracies and authoritarian regimes 
separately, we are able to assess whether institutional safeguards matter more under democratic 
or authoritarian conditions. In so doing, we build on Beth Simmons’s work, which emphasizes 
                                                 
53 See Australian Human Rights Commission, Report of the National Inquiry into Youth Homelessness (Feb. 10, 
1989); Australian Human Rights Commission, Report of the National Inquiry into the Human Rights of People with 
Mental Illness (Oct. 20, 1993); Chris Sidoti, Australian Human Rights Commissioner, Address at the National 
Conference on Mental Health Services, Policy and Law Reform into the Twenty First Century: Mental Health for 
All: What’s the Vision? (Feb. 13–14,1997), available at https://www.humanrights.gov.au/news/speeches/mental-
health-all-whats-vision.  
54 JOHN ACKERMAN, ORGANISMOS AUTÓNOMOS Y DEMOCRACIA: EL CASO MEXICANO 130 (2007). 
55 See RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES (Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa 
eds., 2008); Peter Solomon, Courts and Judges in Authoritarian Regimes, 60 WORLD POL. 122 (2007); Beatriz 
Magaloni & Ruth Kricheli, Political Order and One-Party Rule, 13 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 123 (2010); Tom Ginsburg 
& Mila Versteeg, Why Do Countries Adopt Constitutional Review?, 30 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 587 (2014). 
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that human rights treaties are likely to have different effects depending on a country’s democracy 
level.56 
Why might formal institutional design matter, even when an agency is intended to 
constrain an authoritarian leader in a country with mixed respect for the rule of law? Formal 
institutional design can help guide the agency itself—its ambition, the areas which it might 
prioritize, and fields from which it might steer clear. For example, if an NHRI is explicitly given 
diverse promotional powers, its head might decide to hire public relations personnel, whereas if 
an NHRI is explicitly given diverse investigatory powers, its head might instead decide to hire 
lawyers. Formal institutional design is also likely to shape resistance to the NHRIs activity. If an 
NHRI head embarrasses the executive, but is constitutionally entrenched, given a long mandate, 
immunity, and other independence safeguards, this person may stay in office for longer than an 
NHRI head that lacks these safeguards. Similarly, if NHRI activity clearly falls within its formal 
mandate, litigation challenging this activity might never be initiated, or might fail. In the longer 
term, an NHRI that is empowered and makes use of its broad mandate in opportune moments 
might build up allies, who in turn can help it to resist pressure in hard times. In a similar vein, 
Barkow argues that policy diversification can increase an agency’s resistance to capture.57 In 
contrast, an NHRI with a narrow mandate might not get the chance to build a track record of 
effective contributions, and might become more vulnerable to criticism that its budget should be 
cut or that an alternative institution should be built in its place.  
 
II. ASSESSING NHRI EFFECTIVENESS: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSES 
 
To investigate whether NHRI institutional design matters, we combine qualitative and 
quantitative methods, and pay attention to alternative explanations and to diverse sources of bias. 
We flag some lessons on combining qualitative and quantitative methods to study international 
law problems and elaborate more fully on these techniques in other writing.58  
This section begins by discussing our two quantitative measures of NHRI effectiveness: 
grades awarded by an NHRI peer review network, and an original expert survey. We then 
elaborate on our dataset we constructed. While previous scholarship only examines whether a 
country has or has not adopted an NHRI,59 we identified twenty-two distinct institutional features 
of NHRIs, based on extensive scholarly and practitioner consultation, and compiled an original 
dataset of these features in 107 NHRIs.60 We then present our findings, which assess 
quantitatively whether particular institutional design features are linked to greater effectiveness. 
We find tentative support for the hypothesis that more institutional safeguards lead to more 
effective institutions. We find strong support for the hypothesis that investigatory features in 
particular contribute to NHRI effectiveness. We also find strong support for the hypothesis that 
formal institutional safeguards are especially likely to contribute to organizational effectiveness 
in democratic settings (although we also observe some effects across transition and authoritarian 
                                                 
56 See SIMMONS, supra note 2. 
57 Barkow, supra note 35, at 50. 
58 See Katerina Linos, How to Select and Develop International Law Case Studies: Lessons from Comparative 
Law and Comparative Politics, 109 AJIL 475 (2015); Katerina Linos & Melissa Carlson, Qualitative Methods for 
Law Review Writing, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 213 (2017). 
59 See Kim, supra note 23; Cole & Ramirez, supra note 17. 
60 For details on the dataset and data collection process see Linos & Pegram, The Language of Compromise, 
supra note 7. We are immensely grateful to Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks for their invaluable assistance in this 
data collection effort. 
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regimes). We present additional details, as well as robustness checks, for our quantitative 
analyses, in an online appendix. 
 
A. Measuring NHRI Effectiveness 
 
To assess NHRI effectiveness, we turn to two measures specific to NHRIs, NHRI grades 
and expert survey scores, rather than studying a country’s overall human rights situation before 
and after the NHRI was adopted. In selecting agency-specific, rather than country-level 
assessments, we follow best practice in the comparative study of other types of administrative 
agencies.61 NHRI-specific measures are preferable to more general country-wide human rights 
scores, because many bodies and individuals—including the executive, the legislature, and the 
judiciary—contribute to a country’s overall human rights situation. Therefore, improvements 
correlated with the adoption of an NHRI might be due to other factors. For example, when a new 
reform-minded president is elected, he might set up an NHRI and also change police leadership. 
A country’s police practices could improve shortly after the NHRI is established, even if this 
NHRI does nothing at all, because the reform-minded president has also improved other 
institutions. In more technical terms, NHRI-specific ratings are less likely to capture noise, and, 
in addition, are less likely to give rise to endogeneity concerns.  
At the same time, both of our measures have important limitations, which we detail 
below. The biggest problem with using NHRI grades as measures of NHRI effectiveness is that 
grading is based in part on formal compliance with the Paris Principles. Thus, if our quantitative 
results suggested that features emphasized in the Paris Principles contributed to greater NHRI 
effectiveness, we would not be able to tell whether this was an artifact of the grading process. As 
our main quantitative finding is that certain investigatory features—notably individual 
complaint-handling—contribute to NHRI effectiveness, and these investigatory features are not 
emphasized in the Paris Principles, we are less concerned about this bias. The biggest limitation 
with using expert survey scores as a measure of NHRI effectiveness is that experts assess the 
reputation, rather than the actual performance, of an NHRI; these are often, but not always, 
correlated. We address this limitation in part by combining expert survey scores (which are 
based on a quick overall assessment of an institution) with NHRI grades (which are based on 
very detailed formal assessments of NHRI performance). We also address this limitation by 
turning, in the next section, to carefully selected qualitative studies of specific NHRIs, an 
approach that allows us to study multiple dimensions of NHRI performance, such as success in 
attracting individual complaints, success in resolving individual complaints, success in attracting 
media attention to particular human rights issues, and success in changing legislation. While 
none of the measures we use are perfect, by triangulating across measurements and sources, and 
by building significantly more nuanced measures of effectiveness than are typically used in 
comparative studies, we make significant progress in the assessment of NHRI effectiveness. 
 
1. NHRI peer review grades 
 
Our first measure to assess NHRI effectiveness is the average grade an NHRI has 
received by their NHRI peer review network. Since 1999, an independent, but UN-affiliated, 
NHRI peer review network, the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions 
(GANHRI) (formerly the International Coordinating Committee of NHRIs), and specifically its 
                                                 
61 Hanretty & Koop, supra note 24, at 7–10. 
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Sub-committee on Accreditation (SCA), has given letter grades to individual NHRIs indicating 
compliance with the Paris Principles.62 The SCA is unique within UN structures, serving as the 
gatekeeper of these international standards, independent of UN member states. Significantly, “A” 
status NHRIs are granted participation rights in the UN Human Rights Council.63 The UN Office 
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) serves as a permanent observer and 
secretariat to the SCA and the Sub-Committee invites information from third parties to inform its 
work. We have collected historical grading data from GANHRI reports, with countries given a 
score of four for an A (full compliance), three for an A(reserved), two for a B (partial 
compliance), one for a C (non-compliance), and zero if the NHRI was suspended or accreditation 
was revoked.64  
Preliminary research shows that this peer-grading system, promoted by the UN, has had 
significant policy effects, leveraging both Paris Principles compliance and—most significantly—
enhanced NHRI performance.65 Information on SCA composition, methods of assessment, and 
criteria for grading can be found in its Rules of Procedure.66 In recent years, the SCA has sought 
to fill important gaps in the interpretation of the Paris Principles,67 as well as enhance 
transparency of its grading decisions.68 According to the SCA, NHRI grades reflect an 
applicant’s compliance with the Paris Principles “in both law and practice,” including whether 
“an applicant’s actions demonstrate that it is effectively fulfilling its mandate to promote and 
protect human rights.”69 To this end, the Sub-Committee has recently issued guidance on 
assessing the performance of NHRIs and is investigating further instruments for evaluating 
actual performance in order to strengthen the accreditation mechanism.70 
SCA assessment therefore focuses on both technical compliance and actual NHRI 
performance. Observers disagree on whether accreditation is sufficiently strict.71 As of May 
2017, 78 of 121 accredited NHRIs, or 64 percent, are classified as “A” status.72 Although this 
represents a decline from 74 percent of the total population in 2004,73 the SCA continues to 
                                                 
62 See GANHRI, supra note 8.  
63 See Linos & Pegram, Architects of Their Own Making, supra note 8 (for analysis of significance of the 
GANHRI and Sub-committee on Accreditation (SCA) for Paris Principles compliance). 
64 “A(reserved)” was retired in 2010 and “C” status in 2017. 
65 We are developing a project investigating the significance and impact of the SCA, emblematic of peer review 
and global performance assessments as important new tools in global governance. See Judith G. Kelley & Beth A. 
Simmons, Politics by Number: Indicators as Social Pressure in International Relations, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 55 
(2015). 
66 GANHRI Rules of Procedure for the GANHRI Sub-Committee on Accreditation, adopted 6 March 2017, at 
http://nhri.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/GANHRIAccreditation/Pages/SCAGeneralObservations.aspx. 
67 GANHRI General Observations of the Sub-Committee on Accreditation, adopted 6 March 2017, at 
http://nhri.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/GANHRIAccreditation/Pages/SCAGeneralObservations.aspx. 
68 GANHRI Rules of Procedure, supra note 66. 
69 Id., Rule 8.1.  
70 See GANHRI Bureau, Practice Note 3: Assessing the Performance of NHRIs, 6 March 2017, at 
http://nhri.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/GANHRIAccreditation/Pages/SCAGeneralObservations.aspx. 
71 See Meg Brodie, Progressing Norm Socialisation: Why Membership Matters. The Impact of the Accreditation 
Process of the International Coordinating Committee of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights, 80 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 143, 160 (2011); Peter Rosenblum, Tainted Origins and Uncertain Outcomes, 
in HUMAN RIGHTS, STATE COMPLIANCE, AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 13, 297. 
72 Data from Reports of the SCA, available at 
http://nhri.ohchr.org/EN/Documents/Status%20Accreditation%20Chart%20.pdf (includes all accredited and 
reaccredited NHRIs). 
73 See Linos & Pegram, Architects of Their Own Making, supra note 8, 1124. 
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generally rule an NHRI to be “full compliance.” Grounds for grading and downgrading have 
increasingly focused upon performance rather than design.74 While some NHRIs may not 
technically comply with the Paris Principles, widely documented effective performance appear to 
override such concerns.75 However, in other instances, external observers do raise concerns over 
“A” status designation of poor-performing NHRIs.76 Growing reliance by the SCA on 
accreditation deferrals is indicative of difficulties,77 including resistance by NHRIs themselves to 
more stringent review, especially where government obstruction is at fault. A recent rash of 
challenges to SCA decisions by NHRIs threatened with downgrading speaks to the fraught 
internal politics associated with efforts to “give teeth” to this peer review mechanism.78 
As the above indicates, NHRI grades are imperfect measures of efficacy and it is 
important to acknowledge potential biases in the grading process. Effectiveness should be 
measured not by adherence to a script of globally preferred design features, but on assessment of 
the extent to which an NHRI has improved human rights protections. Grading based on formal 
compliance does risk bias. Specifically, the grading process places special weight on the Paris 
Principles, which emphasize promotional NHRI features and deprioritize investigatory 
features.79 If we observed a strong correlation between promotional features and high grades, we 
would not be able to tell whether this was an artifact of the grading process. As it turns out, we 
observe that NHRIs with investigatory features tend to receive higher grades. As these are not 
emphasized in the grading process, we are less concerned about possible bias.  
Another concern stems from the political nature of SCA decision-making. Historical 
grading patterns do indicate some grade inflation, with “A” status spanning very effective, 
moderately effective, and even potentially non-effective NHRIs. However, while individual SCA 
assessments will not be entirely free of noise, this should not lead us to find insignificant effects 
in our regression analysis when there are true significant effects. Too much noise in the grading 
process could prevent us from identifying effects that actually exist. While “A” status 
designation includes both highly effective and modestly effective NHRIs, we are relatively 
confident that designations below “A” status indicate problems in NHRI effectiveness; this 
demarcation between “A” and below “A” allows us to distinguish somewhat effective from 
somewhat problematic NHRIs. At the same time, because the grading process is noisy, the 
quantitative analysis groups together NHRIs from around the world, and the grading process 
summarizes a lot of information in a single score, we supplement our quantitative analysis with 
careful qualitative work, to study whether particular safeguards might have particular effects in 
specific contexts.  
                                                 
74 See cases of downgrading in Honduras (2010), Sri Lanka (2007), Thailand (2014), and Venezuela (2015). 
75 See, e.g., Palestine Review, in GANHRI Report and Recommendations of the Session of the Sub-Committee 
on Accreditation, at 34 (Nov. 2015) (“PICHR continues to be an effective” NHRI, despite concerns expressed over 
lack of primary legislation); see also Australia Review, in GANHRI Report and Recommendations of the Session of 
the Sub-Committee on Accreditation, at 10–13 (Nov. 2016) (concerns expressed over selection and appointment). 
76 Qatar: National Human Rights Committee to Keep Status A Despite Lack of Independence from the 
Executive, ALKARAMA (Feb. 1, 2016), at https://www.alkarama.org/en/articles/qatar-national-human-rights-
committee-keep-status-despite-lack-independence-executive. See also AiNNI, An NGO Report on the Compliance 
with the Paris Principles by the National Human Rights Commission of India (Jan. 22, 2011), available at 
http://www.peopleswatch.org/dm-documents/HRD/NGO%20Report_Paris%20Principles_NHRC_India.pdf. 
77 UN Body Defers NHRC Accreditation, INDIAN EXPRESS (Feb. 12, 2017), at 
http://indianexpress.com/article/india/un-body-defers-nhrc-accreditation-4520132. 
78 See Preface Note in GANHRI Report and Recommendations of the Session of the Sub-Committee on 
Accreditation (May 9–13, 2016; Mar. 13–17, 2017).  
79 Linos & Pegram, The Language of Compromise, supra note 7, at 615–16.  
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2. Expert survey scores 
 
Second, we combine the above measure with an expert survey—a tool that prior work on 
political parties suggests can be particularly valid for cross-country comparisons.80 Sixty experts 
with in-depth knowledge of NHRI activities and impact on human rights protection within their 
own country, region, and beyond, including policy makers, human rights practitioners, civil 
society representatives, and former NHRI officials, were identified by the project principals. 
Experts were asked to rank the effectiveness of individual NHRIs on a five-point scale. More 
specifically, experts were asked to what extent an NHRI “positively improved and alleviated the 
human rights situation of individuals and groups in a given society,” broadly following the 
general definition of effectiveness offered by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights.81 Experts were instructed to evaluate only those NHRIs with which they were 
familiar. 
The survey was piloted among two experienced NHRI practitioners prior to general 
circulation, with their feedback incorporated into the final document. An expert survey targeted 
at individuals with access to multiple sources of information is particularly appropriate to this 
study given the complexity of assessing NHRI effectiveness in diverse contexts. It was also 
important to ensure a cross section of regional expert representation to reduce referent group 
bias. Thirty-six of the sixty experts we contacted (60 percent), drawn from five continents 
(Africa, the Americas Asia-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East and North Africa), completed 
the survey. This survey represents our original data collection effort, which we administered in 
2013.  
Expert surveys are not yet widely used by legal academics, but are particularly promising 
tools as legal scholars are well-positioned to draft appropriate questions about agency design and 
are often well-connected within expert communities, thus can expect to get a high response rate. 
Nevertheless, expert surveys are also not immune from bias. As with NHRI grades, there is a risk 
that expert judgment will be influenced by the dominant formal model. This form of bias could 
lead experts to inflate their ratings for Paris Principles-compliant NHRIs displaying the full suite 
of strongly recommended promotional features. However, this is not what we find, with our 
expert ratings correlating with a different set of NHRI structural profiles. As such, we are less 
worried about this form of bias. Another concern with expert surveys is that they may measure 
perceptions of efficacy, rather than actual efficacy. Notwithstanding, we follow studies of other 
types of administrative agencies, such as antitrust authorities, in suggesting that expert ratings 
are one of the best available ways to assess agency effectiveness.82 Experts were also carefully 
selected to ensure familiarity with the actual practice of these organizations. 
There is no perfect measure of NHRI effectiveness, nor is a single indicator which can fully 
encapsulate it likely to emerge. Combining these measures with detailed case studies helps 
counteract, but cannot eliminate, the concerns identified. We hope that this research effort will 
encourage scholars to further advance the state-of-the-art on organizational effectiveness. 
 
                                                 
80 See Online Appendix 1 in AJIL Unbound. 
81 See Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), The 20th Anniversary of OHCHR: 20 
Human Rights Achievements, at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/OHCHR20_Backup/Pages/Achievements.aspx. 
82 Hanretty & Koop, supra note 24, at 7–10.  
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3. Controlling for alternative explanations 
 
NHRI institutional design is quite stable over time. Stability in NHRI safeguards is 
important theoretically, as it suggests that governments hostile to NHRIs cannot significantly 
overhaul their institutional structure in times of crisis. Empirically, this requires us to present 
cross-sectional models, where we compare one country to other countries (rather than comparing 
one country to itself in different moments in time). Cross-sectional models require carefully 
specified controls, so we run multiple model specifications, to ensure that the inclusion (or 
exclusion) of certain control variables are not driving our results. There are occasional changes 
in NHRI safeguards over time. As these are rare, we examine them through qualitative case 
studies.  
We utilize a variety of control variables, including a country’s political system, human 
rights performance and level of wealth, as it is possible that it is easier for NHRIs to perform 
effectively in rich, democratic states that experience lower levels of human rights abuse. It is also 
possible that external pressure influences NHRI performance; therefore, we control for how 
much a country is criticized for its human rights performance, and how many INGOs it hosts. 
Finally, we include a binary variable, coding whether or not the NHRI was established before or 
after the UN promulgated the Paris Principles on NHRIs. 
These control variables are based on the human rights literature generally, and on the 
literature on NHRIs in particular.83 Controls are listed in Table 1. In online appendix 1, we 
investigate alternative specifications, with more and fewer control variables; results are quite 
consistent across specifications. Additional control variables that we investigate (in online 
appendix 1) include the population of the country, whether the state experienced a civil war 
within ten years of the establishment of an NHRI, and how open a country is to international 
trade (see online appendix 1, Tables A9 and A10). We also run models with fewer control 
variables, in order to retain more countries in the models, and again results do not change (see 
online appendix 1, Tables A11 and A12). 
 
TABLE 1 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
Control Variables in Main Specifications 
Democracy Score – A score that indicates how democratic or authoritarian a state is in 
the year prior to establishing an NHRI (based on polity data).84  
 
Human Rights Score - A score that indicates the state’s protection of human rights in the 
year prior to establishing an NHRI (based on physical integrity scores).85 
 
Logged GDP per Capita – The log of a country’s GDP per capita in the year prior to the 
establishment of the country’s NHRI.86  
                                                 
83 See Kim, supra note 23; EMILIE HAFNER-BURTON, MAKING HUMAN RIGHTS A REALITY (2013); Emilie 
Hafner-Burton, Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Inﬂuence Government Repression, 59 
INT’L ORG. 593 (2005); Linos & Pegram, The Language of Compromise, supra note 7.  
84 MONTY G. MARSHALL & KEITH JAGGERS, POLITY IV PROJECT: POLITICAL REGIME CHARACTERISTICS AND 
TRANSITIONS, 1800–2002, DATASET USERS’ MANUAL (2002), available at 
http://www3.nd.edu/~mcoppedg/crd/PolityIVUsersManualv2002.pdf.  
85 See David L. Cingranelli, The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data Project, 32 HUM. RTS. Q. 395 
(2004). 
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Naming and Shaming – An index that reflects the attention a country receives for human 
rights abuses, from general media (e.g., Newsweek), advocacy groups (e.g., Amnesty 
International), and the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in the year prior to 
the establishment of an NHRI.87  
 
INGO Score – Active INGOs often correlate with better human rights practices. Total 
number of INGOs that count at least one citizen or domestic organization as a member, 
from the Union of International Associations. Score reflects the number prior to NHRI 
establishment.88  
 
NHRI After 1992 – A binary variable that takes the value of one if the NHRI was 
established after the United Nations’ adoption of the Paris Principles, which outlined 
recommendations for NHRIs. 
 
Additional Control Variables in Alternative Specifications 
Population - The size of the country's population in the year prior to the NHRI's 
enactment.89  
 
Civil War – A binary variable that takes the value of one if the state if the country 
experienced a civil conflict within ten years of an NHRI’s enactment.90  
 
Trade as a Percent of GDP – Countries that are more economically dependent on other 
states may be more susceptible to international human rights pressure. This variable 
records trade as a percentage of a country’s GDP in the year prior to the establishment of 
its NHRI.91  
 
 
B. Quantitative Findings on NHRI Effectiveness 
 
Our first hypothesis is that NHRIs with more institutional safeguards of any type are 
more likely to obtain high grades and high expert survey scores. Our first independent variable is 
a simple count of formal institutional safeguards; it could theoretically range from zero to 
twenty-two, but in our dataset it ranges from six to nineteen. We find a positive and statistically 
significant correlation between the number of safeguards an NHRI has, and higher NHRI grades, 
even when including controls. In contrast, when we include control variables, we do not find a 
                                                                                                                                                             
86 The World Bank, World Bank National Accounts Data and OECD National Accounts Data Files: GDP Per 
Capita (1960–2015), at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD.  
87 See Wade M. Cole & Francisco O. Ramirez, Conditional Decoupling Assessing the Impact of National 
Human Rights Institutions, 1981 to 2004, 78 AM. SOC. REV. 702 (2013). 
88 Id.  
89 See Kristian S. Gleditsch, Expanded Trade and GDP Data, 46 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 712 (2002).  
90 See Nils Petter Gleditsch, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg & Håvard Strand, 
Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset, 39 J. PEACE RES. 615 (2002); Therése Pettersson & Peter Wallensteen, 
Armed Conflicts, 1946–2014, 52 J. PEACE RES. 536 (2015). 
91 The World Bank, World Bank National Accounts Data and OECD National Accounts Data Files: Trade (% of 
GDP) (1960–2015), at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS.  
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statistically significant correlation between more NHRI safeguards and higher NHRI survey 
scores (see Table 2).  
The regressions in Table 2 demonstrate that NHRIs with more institutional safeguards 
tend to receive higher marks from the GANHRI. We also investigate whether NHRIs function 
differently in democracies and in authoritarian regimes. To separate our sample into 
democracies, on the one hand, and transition and authoritarian regimes on the other, we identify 
states with a polity score of one or higher as democracies.92 We find that the correlation between 
more institutional safeguards (of any type), and NHRI effectiveness is much stronger for 
democracies than for authoritarian and transition regimes. All our regression models are based on 
Ordinary Least Squared regression (OLS). Therefore, results are easy to interpret, as each 
variable’s coefficient indicates the expected effect a one-unit change in the independent variable 
has on the dependent variable. For example, a democratic state’s average grade over time, on a 
four-point scale, is expected to be .12 points higher for each additional safeguard that the NHRI 
incorporates (as compared to 0.06 points for other states). Another way to interpret this 
coefficient is to compare countries with many NHRIs safeguards (in the top 10 percent) to 
countries with few NHRI safeguards (in the bottom 90 percent). Among democracies, we expect 
countries in the top 90 percent of formal NHRI safeguards to be a full grade higher on average 
than states in the bottom 10 percent.  
 
TABLE 2 
NHRIS WITH MORE SAFEGUARDS GET HIGHER AVERAGE GRADES 
 
 
Dependent Variable:  
NHRI Grade 
Dependent Variable:  
Expert Survey Score 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All Dem Auth All Dem Auth 
              
Total No. of Safeguards 0.06* 0.12*** 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) 
Democracy Score 0.01 0.01 -0.04 0.04* 0.17** 0.00 
   (0.02) (0.07) (0.08) (0.02) (0.07) (0.09) 
Human Rights Score -0.04 0.06 -0.12 0.05 0.06 -0.02 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.10) (0.06) (0.07) (0.12) 
Logged GDP per Capita -0.02 -0.16 0.14 -0.13 -0.01 -0.24 
 (0.11) (0.16) (0.18) (0.11) (0.16) (0.21) 
Naming and Shaming 0.08 0.15 0.04 0.08 0.24* 0.03 
 (0.06) (0.12) (0.08) (0.06) (0.12) (0.10) 
INGOs Score 0.26 0.41 0.65* 0.38* -0.02 0.53 
 (0.22) (0.31) (0.36) (0.22) (0.32) (0.41) 
NHRI After 1992 -0.26 -0.30 0.00 -0.40* -0.38 -0.28 
 (0.22) (0.25) (0.42) (0.22) (0.25) (0.48) 
Constant 1.50 0.25 -1.55 1.05 1.89 0.87 
                                                 
92 Models presented in the appendix demonstrate that the results are robust to changes in the cut-point between 
democracies and autocracies. More specifically, when we compare stable democracies (scoring over five on the 
polity score) to all other countries, we find similar patterns.  
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 (1.35) (1.73) (2.63) (1.43) (1.92) (3.01) 
       
Observations 65 41 24 62 39 23 
R-squared 0.19 0.30 0.40 0.27 0.31 0.29 
Standard errors in 
parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
 
We next turn to investigate which NHRI safeguards contribute most to higher 
effectiveness scores. Our cumulative index (where we simply add up the total number of 
safeguards) could conceal as much as it reveals, if some safeguards are very important even in 
authoritarian regimes, while others are useless. As described in Part I above, we have constructed 
four indexes, based on administrative law theory and on NHRI-specific writings; additional 
details are available in the online appendix. 
Our main finding is that investigatory powers are particularly likely to contribute to 
NHRI effectiveness. Table 3 suggests that NHRIs that have more formal safeguards related to 
investigating human rights appear to be especially effective relative to other NHRIs. More 
specifically, NHRIs that have more investigative safeguards are more likely to receive higher 
grades and higher expert survey scores than NHRIs lacking these safeguards. 
We also find that investigatory powers are important across NHRIs, but particularly 
likely to contribute to NHRI effectiveness in democratic states. In a democratic country, an 
NHRI with an additional investigative safeguard is likely to receive a .25 point increase in the 
GANHRI’s average grade (on a four-point scale). An NHRI in a democratic country with an 
additional investigative safeguard is also likely to receive a .22 point increase in its average 
expert survey score (five-point scale). The relationship between more safeguards related to 
investigations, and higher NHRI grades and scores is very robust, and holds across different 
country types, with different types of controls included and excluded, whether or not we include 
outlier NHRIs. We conduct a large variety of robustness checks in the online appendix, and these 
results hold up. 
In contrast, the relationships between the other indexes we study and more effective 
NHRIs are not robust to alternative specifications. It is very possible that NHRIs with greater 
formal independence and NHRIs with a more inclusive mandate are more effective in particular 
types of contexts, as Table 3 suggests, but the correlations we see are too tentative to make firm 
generalizations.  
 
TABLE 3 
NHRIS WITH MORE INVESTIGATIVE SAFEGUARDS GET HIGHER AVERAGE GRADES AND EXPERT 
SURVEY SCORES 
 
 
Dependent Variable:  
NHRI Grade 
Dependent Variable:  
Expert Survey Score 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All Dem Auth All Dem Auth 
              
Investigate Index 0.14* 0.25** 0.10 0.16** 0.22** 0.14 
 (0.07) (0.10) (0.11) (0.07) (0.11) (0.10) 
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Independence Index  0.04 0.16 0.03 0.01 -0.03 0.29* 
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.18) (0.08) (0.10) (0.16) 
Promotion Index  0.08 0.09 -0.24 -0.17 -0.08 -0.89*** 
 (0.14) (0.18) (0.32) (0.14) (0.16) (0.28) 
Inclusiveness Index  0.15 0.33** -0.24 -0.07 -0.16 -0.19 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.28) (0.11) (0.12) (0.24) 
Democracy Score 0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.05** 0.22*** 0.11 
 (0.03) (0.07) (0.09) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07) 
Human Rights Score -0.03 0.06 -0.14 0.03 0.05 -0.09 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.10) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) 
Logged GDP per Capita 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.11* 0.24** 0.08 
 (0.06) (0.13) (0.09) (0.06) (0.12) (0.08) 
Naming and Shaming -0.24 -0.31 0.31 -0.37* -0.53** 0.52 
 (0.22) (0.26) (0.51) (0.22) (0.23) (0.43) 
INGOs Score 0.26 0.44 0.68 0.30 -0.14 0.76** 
 (0.22) (0.31) (0.40) (0.21) (0.29) (0.34) 
NHRI After 1992 0.00 -0.10 0.26 -0.03 0.12 0.11 
 (0.12) (0.17) (0.20) (0.11) (0.15) (0.18) 
Constant 0.87 -0.91 -1.53 1.17 1.66 -1.28 
 (1.43) (1.81) (3.26) (1.44) (1.86) (2.77) 
 0.14* 0.25** 0.10 0.16** 0.22** 0.14 
Observations 65 41 24 62 39 23 
R-squared 0.23 0.40 0.51 0.37 0.50 0.68 
Standard errors in 
parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
 
Even though the relationship between more investigatory safeguards and higher NHRI 
grades and survey scores is very robust, the statistical analyses we have presented can only 
demonstrate correlations. We next explore qualitative evidence to identify the causal 
mechanisms at work.  
 
III. ASSESSING NHRI EFFECTIVENESS: CASE STUDIES 
 
In this section, we develop paired case studies from Asia Pacific and South America to 
deepen exploration of how the presence (or absence) of protective and promotional design 
features contribute to NHRI effectiveness. Case studies allow us to go beyond the correlations 
just described, which link the presence of design attributes to effectiveness assessments. Case 
studies illuminate whether and how these safeguards are employed in different contexts, and 
allow us to better understand why particular safeguards could lead to more effective NHRIs. We 
establish the plausibility of effectiveness claims through two techniques: careful within-region 
case selection and extensive within-case process tracing.93 This involves investigating a series of 
logically interconnected propositions about how formal safeguards are used in different contexts, 
                                                 
93 See Linos, How to Select and Develop International Law Case Studies, supra note 58; Linos & Carlson, 
supra note 58; GEORGE & BENNETT, supra note 26. 
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how governmental actors respond, what substitutes are invented, with a view to causally linking 
particular outcomes to particular safeguards, and not to background conditions.   
How might institutional design attributes improve human rights outcomes? If an NHRI is 
given a mandate to receive complaints or advise on legislation, does it carry out such actions 
frequently and effectively, or does its mandate go unutilized? Do NHRI activities provoke 
governmental responses, and if so, is there mostly governmental backlash, or also a positive 
response? Do human rights observers praise or criticize the NHRI, and do these assessments 
relate to the NHRI’s formal institutional structure? How do NHRI heads themselves assess the 
institutional framework in which they work—do they see it as an aid, a hindrance, or as 
irrelevant? And what happens with NHRIs that lack important institutional safeguards? Can 
creative leadership carry out important activities even in the absence of an explicit mandate, or 
does the lack of formal safeguards significantly compromise their efforts? Finally, do we see 
dynamic effects, where virtuous (or vicious) cycles develop over time?  
In an ideal world, we would compare otherwise identical NHRIs that differ only in the 
presence (or absence) of particular design safeguards. In practice, country cases tend to differ 
along multiple dimensions. One way to address this is to try to pick shadow cases conservatively. 
That is, shadow cases (i.e. cases lacking the safeguards we study) should be no less democratic, 
no less respectful of human rights, and no poorer than our main cases (cases with the safeguards 
we study). This is because each of these factors (and especially democracy) could make it easier 
for an NHRI to carry out its functions effectively, and we want to avoid attributing to formal 
safeguards what should be attributed to a favorable context. 
In addition, in an ideal world, the presence (or absence) of such safeguards would be 
randomly assigned. Random assignment would help us set aside a plausible alternative 
explanation: that NHRIs with more formal safeguards are set up by governments that are 
especially keen to improve human rights, and would improve human rights performance 
regardless of NHRI activities.  
An unusual feature of NHRI design allows us to move closer to this random assignment 
ideal than is typical for observational work. In the early 1990s, the UN proposed a template for 
NHRI design—the Paris Principles. This template emphasized promotive functions, and 
deemphasized protective functions. This was done by mistake—Paris Principle drafters were not 
aware of a robust Ibero-American human rights ombudsman tradition with strong protective 
functions.94 Because this international template was highly influential, NHRIs set up after Paris 
were much more likely to include promotive functions, and much less likely to include protective 
functions, than NHRIs set up earlier.95 We therefore compare countries that adopted NHRIs 
shortly after Paris, to countries that adopted NHRIs shortly before Paris, as in many cases design 
choices are heavily influenced by international fashion. 
 
A. NHRIs With and Without Protective Safeguards in Latin America 
 
Our South American case studies in this section highlight the importance of protective 
design features, specifically the ability of NHRIs to handle individual complaints. We use a 
most-similar research design to study two otherwise similar cases that vary on the independent 
                                                 
94 Linos & Pegram, The Language of Compromise, supra note 7, at 599. 
95 Linos & Pegram, Architects of Their Own Making, supra note 8, at 1110, 1121; Linos & Pegram, supra note 
7, The Language of Compromise, at 601–02. 
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variable: complaint-handing powers (see Table 4). Importantly, the reason for variation on this 
design feature is quasi-exogenous. Most Latin American NHRIs, including the Peruvian case we 
study, included complaint-handling safeguards because they copied the Iberian Ombudsman 
template. These bodies were set up before the UN endorsed the Paris Principles. In contrast, the 
Chilean NHRI, set up after Paris, lacked this safeguard, because Chile followed the new 
dominant international model. 
 
TABLE 4 
CASE STUDY SELECTION OVERVIEW 
 
 Date Region Office Type 
Independence 
Safeguards 
Investigatory 
Powers 
Promotional 
Functions 
Chile 2009 
Latin 
America 
Commission 4 2 3 
Peru 1993 
Latin 
America 
Ombudsman 5 5 3 
 
As with all such comparative exercises, Chile and Peru do not match perfectly and differ 
in important respects with regard to democratic performance. Notably, the Peruvian NHRI was 
established in the 1993 Constitution under an autocratic regime. It began operations in 1996, 
with the country transitioning to a fragile democracy in 2000. The Chilean office began work in 
2010 in a comparatively robust democratic setting, with Chile having transitioned to democracy 
over twenty years earlier. However, the challenge of human rights protection raises pressing 
concerns in both contexts. Given that Peru displays a weaker attachment to democratic practices 
and respect for rights, if context drove results, we would expect the Peruvian NHRI to be less 
effective than the Chilean body. Indeed, given the adverse democratic and rule of law conditions 
confronted by the Peruvian office it can be considered a “least likely case” for success.96 This 
expectation does not materialize. 
Broadly, as summarized in Table 5, our case study of Peru highlights how the NHRI’s 
ability to receive individual complaints has been an important source of authority. The Peruvian 
Ombudsman has proven adept at scaling up individual complaints to intervene in national policy 
debates and pushing for redress of systemic and structural rights violations. In contrast, the 
Chilean experience illustrates how a lack of complaint-handling powers has hampered the 
protective function of the NHRI. Notwithstanding important interventions on matters of national 
interest, the Chilean office has struggled to consolidate its image as a bridge between the state 
and citizen. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
96 John Gerring, Is There a (Viable) Crucial-Case Method?, 40 COMP. POL. STUD. 231, 234 (2007). 
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TABLE 5 
SUMMARY OF LATIN AMERICAN CASE STUDIES 
 
 
Peruvian Human Rights 
Ombudsman 
Chilean National Institute 
for Human Rights 
Investigatory 
safeguards possessed 
by the office? 
Power to investigate; Can 
compel evidence/testimony; 
Security facilities; Can refer 
complaints; Individual 
complaints. 
Power to investigate; Can 
refer complaints. 
Why does the NHRI 
have (or lack) 
investigatory powers? 
No global model available—so 
Peru copied Iberian 
Ombudsman which had these 
safeguards 
Chile copied new global 
model (Paris Principles) which 
lacked these safeguards 
Does the NHRI make 
use of its powers to 
receive and 
investigate individual 
complaints? 
Yes. Very high volume of 
complaints received and 
processed. Leveraged 
complaints to generate political 
impact. 
Yes. In the one area where 
NHRI has investigatory 
powers (torture) NHRI is very 
active.  
NHRI also active where given 
powers—has made good use 
of promotional powers. 
Do local actors 
attribute NHRI 
success/failure to 
presence (or absence) 
of investigatory 
safeguard? 
Yes. Observers highlight how 
complaint-handling has 
enabled the NHRI to address 
systemic violations, as well as 
build broad-based public 
support. 
Yes. Observers attribute 
challenges confronted by 
NHRI to a lack of 
investigatory capabilities. 
How does government 
respond to NHRI use 
of its investigation 
powers? 
Initially, Fujimori government 
welcomes peripheral activity 
(e.g. challenges to utility 
pricing) but resists challenges 
to core state interests (e.g. 
security). Transition to 
democracy lessens resistance 
initially, although conditions 
have deteriorated markedly 
since 2003. 
NHRI has encountered robust 
resistance from conservative 
politicians and the security 
sector to its work on torture. 
Successive and severe budget 
cuts between 2011 and 2013 
are indicative of a lack of 
political support for the office.  
Does 
presence/absence of 
institutional 
safeguards create 
virtuous/vicious 
feedback loops? 
Yes. Volume of individual 
complaints grew over time as 
complaint resolution gets 
media publicity. Effective 
investigative action by the 
NHRI has reinforced 
credibility of the office and its 
leadership.  
Yes. Absence of complaint-
handling powers has 
weakened NHRI in budget 
negotiations. Limited 
investigative jurisdiction has 
also diminished public 
engagement and visibility of 
the office. 
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B. Peruvian Human Rights Ombudsman 
 
Established in 1993 by the autocratic regime of President Alberto Fujimori (1990–2000) in 
an effort to placate international critics, the Peruvian NHRI (human rights ombudsman) 
nevertheless quickly became, practically, the sole democratic state agent of accountability.97 
Following democratic transition in 2000, the NHRI adapted to its new institutional context, 
described as holding “a solid political position not only in public life in general, but also with 
regard to the respect that it commands from other state institutions.”98 As evidenced in this study, 
and affirmed elsewhere,99 the authority of the Peruvian ombudsman hinges in large part on its 
ability to instrumentalize an individual complaints mechanism to facilitate citizen access to 
administrative redress, as well pursue high-impact accountability activities. 
 
 1. Explaining the robust investigative powers of the Peruvian NHRI 
 
The Peruvian office is included in the 1993 Constitution. Constitutional provisions of 
independence and powers are robust. The NHRI’s mandate comprises two primary areas: to 
defend the constitutional and fundamental rights of persons and to oversee the performance of 
the state administration.100 Public entities are legally obliged to cooperate with its 
investigations.101 Although the NHRI has no powers of enforcement, it can initiate a range of 
legal actions.102 The office can also present draft legislation, advise on existing legislative 
projects, and issue annual reports and recommendations.103 Importantly, powers of investigation 
include authority to launch investigations ex officio or on receipt of complaints.104 
A political act of good faith to the international community, the 1993 Constitution 
contained a variety of democratic innovations. The new NHRI did not provoke widespread 
discussion, enjoying as it did both domestic antecedent within the prosecutor’s office and strong 
international support.105 The World Bank Lima office was particularly engaged in lobbying for 
the office, providing $31.6 million to be distributed between the judiciary and the NHRI in late 
1997.106 The introduction of the office to the Peruvian context can be placed in a wider 
international trend toward global diffusion of liberal regulatory structures during the 1990s.107 
                                                 
97 See Thomas Pegram, Accountability in Hostile Times: The Case of the Peruvian Human Rights Ombudsman 
1996–2001, 40 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 51 (2008). 
98 Uggla, supra note 14, at 446. 
99 Thomas Pegram, Weak Institutions, Rights Claims and Pathways to Compliance: The Transformative Role of 
the Peruvian Human Rights Ombudsman, 39 OXFORD DEV. STUD. 229, 236 (2011). 
100 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL PERÚ [POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF PERU], Dec. 31, 1993, Art. 162. 
101 Law No. 26520, Art. 26, Ley Orgánica de la Defensoría del Pueblo (Organic Law of the Office of the 
Ombudsman), Agosto 8, 1995 (Peru). 
102 Id. Art. 9. 
103 Id. Arts. 9, 27. 
104 Id. Art. 9. 
105 Interview with Samuel Abad, former Deputy Ombudsman for Constitutional Affairs, Defensoría del Pueblo 
(Peruvian NHRI), in Lima, Peru (July 14, 2005).  
106 Email from Daniel Cotlear, Country Sector Leader, The World Bank, to author (Feb. 21, 2006, 04:04 EST) 
(on file with author). 
107 See Thomas Pegram, Diffusion Across Political Systems: The Global Spread of National Human Rights 
Institutions, 32 HUM. RTS. Q. 729 (2010). See generally KATERINA LINOS, THE DEMOCRATIC FOUNDATIONS OF 
POLICY DIFFUSION: HOW HEALTH, FAMILY AND EMPLOYMENT LAWS SPREAD ACROSS COUNTRIES (2013); Katerina 
Linos, Diffusion Through Democracy, 55 AM. J. POL. SCI. 678 (2011).  
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It is widely accepted among Latin American experts that Article 54 of the 1978 Spanish 
Constitution provides the “true paradigm” for the Iberian human rights ombudsman.108 The 
Spanish ombudsman emulates the Swedish classical ombudsman in granting extensive 
investigative prerogatives and complaint-handling powers. But in a novel twist, it also 
incorporates human rights as an explicit standard of control. The legacy effect of this 
international diffusion story is apparent in the design and reception of the Latin American 
Ombudsman, initially viewed as “an institution of administrative law . . . responsible for 
attending to cases of maladministration in order to achieve, through persuasion, remedy for those 
citizens affected.”109 Its human rights function was not well-understood. 
There appears to be a general consensus among observers that Fujimori and his advisors 
had little notion of the role that the NHRI would eventually play in upholding the constitutional 
order and human rights.110 As the first Ombudsman elaborates: 
 
You have to understand, in 1993 nobody really understood what the Ombudsman was 
and even less, gave it any importance. I had lived in Mexico and Central America, where 
the institution first began—in Guatemala. From this experience, I had a good idea of its 
potential.111 
 
The main goals of the regime having been achieved, little attention was paid to such a 
peripheral innovation.112 In addition, the NHRI was considered a potentially useful addition to 
their economic objectives. The incorporation of such a modern institution dedicated to affirming 
citizens’ rights would, it was hoped, symbolize a break with a succession of highly discredited 
administrations, as well as ameliorate the social cost of neoliberal policies.113 Despite the 
presence of formal democratic protections, once the constitution of 1993 began to function, it 
quickly became apparent that the “rules of the game” were distinctly in Fujimori’s favor.114 
Nevertheless, as the following section details, the Peruvian NHRI did not play by the Fujimori 
regime rules, tapping instead into a powerful source of independent authority derived from its 
ability to receive complaints. 
 
2. The impact of robust investigative powers on the Peruvian NHRI 
 
Activating its mandate to investigate individual complaints emerged as a core strategic 
focus for the Peruvian NHRI. The office has experienced a progressive increase in caseload, 
                                                 
108 Jorge Santistevan, El Defensor del Pueblo en Iberoamérica (The Ombudsman in Latin America), in RETOS 
ACTUALES DE LAS INSTITUCIONES NACIONALES DE PROTECCIÓN Y PROMOCIÓN DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS 
(CURRENT CHALLENGES OF NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS FOR THE PROTECTION AND PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS) 27, 
31 (2004). 
109 Id. at 28. Across Latin America, all NHRIs adopted before the Paris Principles resembled the Spanish 
Ombudsmen in institutional design—these include Guatemala (1985), Mexico (1990), Honduras (1990), Colombia 
(1991), El Salvador (1991), Costa Rica (1992), Paraguay (1992), Argentina (1993), and Peru (1993). 
110 Email from Jorge Santistevan, former Ombudsman (1996–2000), Defensoría del Pueblo Perú (Peruvian 
NHRI), to author (Feb. 22, 2006, 14:28 GMT) (on file with author). 
111 Id. 
112 Interview with Abad, supra note 79. 
113 Interview with Marcial Rubio, former Minister for Education, Ministerio de Educación del Perú (Ministry of 
Education of Peru), in Lima, Peru (Sept. 7, 2005). 
114 CATHERINE CONAGHAN, FUJIMORI’S PERU: DECEPTION IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE 25 (2005). 
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from 16,478 cases in 1997, 59,867 in 2001, and 130,616 in 2016.115 In part, this reflects an 
institutional supply and demand process. Increasing the supply of institutional channels often 
encourages demand, especially in a weak democratic setting where victims of human rights 
violations find that they have little recourse to justice.  
The Peruvian NHRI has adapted its own working practices to manage complaint 
reception and investigation with a view to achieving impact, without being overwhelmed by the 
sheer volume of demand. Upon reception, the ombudsman operates a triage strategy with cases 
divided into (1) complaints (human rights violations requiring intervention), (2) petitions 
(potential violations related to omission by state officials or public service providers), and (3) 
consultations (cases received that fall outside the jurisdiction of the institution). Consultations 
made up 50 percent of total cases received in 2016, resulting in referral of individuals to the 
appropriate public entity. It is important to note that the formal obligation falling on the 
ombudsman is to attend and assist the complainant, but the duty of resolution falls on the public 
administration.116 
Complaint-handling has posed both opportunities and challenges, particularly with regard 
to managing expectations in a context of institutional dysfunctionality. In meeting this challenge, 
complaint-handling has become an important focal point for informational campaigns, with the 
office issuing press releases informing the general public of complaints received and efforts to 
achieve their resolution.117 However, ombudsman officials acknowledge that more needs to be 
done to raise awareness of the office among the general population: “most Peruvians have a very 
unclear understanding of the state. Often, they only begin to gain that knowledge when they need 
help.”118 
Civil society observers attribute the impact and legitimacy of the Peruvian NHRI in large 
part to high profile efforts to pursue resolution of individual and collective complaints. Indeed, 
the dramatic rise in complaints throughout the 1990s responds to high-profile and successful 
NHRI campaigns, such as the Ad Hoc Commission (the Commission). Established in August 
1996, this ad hoc entity was charged with reviewing the sentences of thousands of innocent 
Peruvians in remand custody on alleged terrorism offences. The NHRI had been inundated with 
complaints from NGOs and prisoners’ family members from day one.119 Credit for breaking a 
negotiation deadlock is largely attributed to the brinkmanship of the first Ombudsman, Jorge 
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Santistevan.120 Images of released innocents received extensive media coverage, contributing to 
the profile of the ombudsman and cementing links with the Peruvian public.121 
Cultivating a reputation for successful intervention upon complaint has also sheltered the 
NHRI from political attack as it has sought to expand its activities.122 Investigations pursued by 
the Peruvian ombudsman into complaints of human rights violations have often provoked 
governmental resistance, even hostility. Under autocratic government, a diverse set of political 
and civil violations were a significant part of total complaints received (disappearances, judicial 
malpractice, police misconduct, and prison conditions). Civil society organizations and 
international monitors provided vital support, as evident in the success of the Commission 
initiative. In turn, the ombudsman worked with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to build 
legal cases on behalf of victims of alleged torture and other violations.123 The reactive element of 
the office’s mandate proved fundamental, with the NHRI well-placed to scale up individual 
complaints to address systemic concerns, including the military justice system, torture, judicial 
reform, and freedom of the press. Perhaps most notoriously, the NHRI, in coordination with 
church groups and NGOs, exposed a systematic campaign of forced sterilization of indigenous 
women, resulting in international condemnation.124 
Routine complaints also addressed a wide variety of governmental functions. A 
consistent 50 percent or more of all complaints during the 1990s concerned official omission or 
neglect, such as delays in paying pensions, wages, and social benefits.125 Complaints targeting 
newly privatized public services were also considerable, averaging 10 percent, and focused on 
steep tariffs, quality of service, and access.126 One former official recalls the dramatic effect of 
informing complainants that they were under no obligation to pay unfair or incorrect water 
charges prior to disputing the amount: “Suddenly, we had fifteen hundred complaints, the people 
were suddenly empowered against the administration. It was truly a cultural change and the 
complaints served to achieve this.”127 On such issues the office also pursued investigations 
conducive to official cooperation and even endorsement.128 In turn, media exposure and national 
campaigns generated many more complaints. 
Forceful rights advocacy on the part of the NHRI post-transition to democracy in 2000 
has underpinned its enduring public support, but also provoked powerful adversaries. Under the 
transition government of Valentin Paniagua (2000–2001) the Peruvian ombudsman emerged as a 
key advisor on government policy.129 However, a brief democratic spring proved short-lived, 
with government relations deteriorating rapidly under the administrations of President Alan 
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Garcia (2006–2011) and President Ollanta Humala (2012–2016), both of whom were themselves 
implicated in serious human rights violations. 
The ombudsman has refused to back down in the face of government obstruction on high-
profile issues ranging from forced sterilization to torture, transparency reform, and military 
conscription.130 A 2012 legislative decree enforcing military conscription through public lottery 
and imposing substantial fines for non-compliance provoked a flood of complaints to the 
ombudsman.131 In response, the office issued a legal opinion declaring the decree 
unconstitutional and called for its suspension until the Ministry of Defense had conducted a 
review. This proposal was rejected. The ombudsman then successfully argued an emergency 
petition (amparo) before the Superior Court in Lima, suspending the lottery. This successful 
action was strongly denounced by the president himself.132 Nevertheless, hostility does not 
characterize interactions with the executive in other policy areas.133 
More generally, in recent years the ombudsman has continued to pursue resolution of 
complaints, making use of new pockets of cooperation. The ombudsman publicizes data on the 
level of official cooperation with recommendations stemming from complaints. Time series data 
published by the office itself from 2002 to 2007 reveals that 59.7 percent of all complaints 
actioned “received a positive response” from the corresponding state agency.134 This figure stood 
at 67 percent in 2016. Such actions have also led to emulation effects within the public 
administration, with the National Pension Office (ONP) establishing its own complaint reception 
and resolution unit, which regularly meets with ombudsman technical personnel to expedite 
cases. Complaints to the ombudsman against the ONP have subsequently fallen by almost 50 
percent.135 
The NHRI has continued to scale up individual complaints to address systemic concerns, 
reflecting an evolving rights landscape. A growing volume of complaints refer to structural 
violations of an economic, social, and environmental nature.136 Tackling such issues often entails 
a different mode of intervention, with the ombudsman pursuing resolution principally through 
dialogue and technical cooperation, as opposed to (what would likely be protracted) legal action. 
Importantly, timely intervention on local issues has also reinforced the profile of the office as 
responsive to the needs of inhabitants. In the wake of devastating flooding in Peru in early 2017, 
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the ombudsman was quick to coordinate an emergency response in response to complaints by 
those affected.137  
Our Peruvian case study demonstrates a range of positive feedback loops attributable to 
an NHRI’s ability to receive individual complaints. It has provided impetus for the ombudsman 
to enhance access and availability of services to the public; special protection to designated 
vulnerable groups; and informational campaigns through the media.138 It has also served to 
legitimate the organization in the eyes of the public. The intention behind the creation of the 
NHRI may have been to install a palliative institutional placebo. However, astute media 
engagement on complaint resolution has established a robust institutional image of efficacy. 
Success and publicity in fields such as utility regulation has further empowered the ombudsman 
to enter sensitive policy domains, including security, as well as move from individual complaint-
handling to demands for systemwide reforms. 
There are also important interaction effects in play, in particular between complaint-
handling and decentralization of operations. The ombudsman was established with a plan to 
“progressively introduce offices in each departmental capital throughout Peru.”139 There are 
currently thirty-eight decentralized offices located throughout the country. In 2016, 63 percent of 
complaints were received by regional offices outside Lima.140 Growth in the volume of 
complaints, coupled with the resource demands of decentralization, has also provided the 
ombudsman with important leverage in budget negotiations. Budget increases from $4.4 million 
in 2001 to $13.6 million in 2009, in a context of public sector cuts, is attributed to the office’s 
decentralized reception of complaints141 and the negotiation skills of successive ombudsmen.142 
The office’s budget in 2016 was $18.1 million.143 
In a country where the state has traditionally neglected the institutional sphere of 
representative democracy, the logic pursued by NHRI officials to empower citizens against the 
public administration by encouraging them to claim their “right to complain” has had a powerful 
cultural impact.144 The ombudsman has consistently enjoyed among the highest public approval 
ratings of any state institution.145 According to one civil society observer: 
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The ombudsman has gained public support above all because it listened to the people. In 
a country where nobody has ever listened to the people, the very fact that someone could 
go to their offices and be heard was very important.146 
 
The success of the NHRI has also set in motion less desirable feedback loops. The office 
has been subject to attempts by congress to install partisan individuals, thwarted repeatedly by 
public outcry, most dramatically resulting in street protests in 2013.147 However, in September 
2016, with the Fujimori-aligned Popular Force (Fuerza Popular) party commanding an absolute 
majority in Congress, the NHRI finally succumbed to political pressure.148 The successful 
candidate was appointed through an opaque procedure with no opportunity for public 
consultation and is linked to past controversies.149  
However, despite widespread misgivings, the office continues to function effectively, as 
is indicated in its rapid response to devastating floods in early 2017. In December 2016, it 
received the highest public approval rating of any state institution.150 Problematic appointments 
may, under adverse conditions, prove difficult to ward against, irrespective of formal 
institutional design. However, as this comparative study highlights, such an outcome is neither 
inevitable nor irreversible. Formal safeguards support and protect an ombudsman committed to 
the effective functioning of the institution. The Peruvian NHRI has achieved much and the 
protection imperative underlying each of the thousands of complaints it continues to receive 
remains undiminished, as does its public support. 
 
C. Chilean National Institute of Human Rights 
 
The Chilean NHRI lacks explicit investigative faculties, such as the ability to compel 
evidence or receive individual complaints. In large part, this is due to the office being established 
in accordance with the Paris Principles, which only weakly recommends these protective 
features. Even though the Chilean office was set up in a less challenging political environment 
than in Peru, it has not been able to consolidate its protective profile or remedy important 
systemic protection deficits. By comparing these two cases, the study substantiates the important 
effects on institutional outcomes of formal provisions of investigation, particularly individual 
complaint-handling. 
 
1. Explaining the limited investigative powers of the Chilean NHRI 
 
Chile emerged from a protracted period of authoritarian government and systematic 
human rights violations in 1990. Human rights defenders point to the legacy effects of this 
experience in a lack of progress in enhancing access to justice and the entrenched exclusion of 
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traditionally marginalized groups within Chilean society.151 Torture and arbitrary detention 
persists and Chile also displays one of the highest levels of incarceration in Latin America.152 
At the close of 2009 the Chilean Senate approved the creation of the National Institute for 
Human Rights (INDH).153 Robust legal prerogatives regarding grave human rights violations and 
custodianship over the Chilean Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s legacy reflect its 
regional and domestic setting. But a formal orientation toward promotion over protection, and 
the omission of important protection faculties is a significant departure from the Iberian human 
rights ombudsman. Independence provisions also do not follow regional precedent, lacking 
constitutional entrenchment, the INDH is comprised of a director and seven councilors, including 
two appointed by the president.154 
The Chilean Institute stands alone among its regional NHRI peers, with no explicit 
provision to receive complaints.155 What explains the lack of complaint-handling powers in this 
case? Political opposition to a robust human rights structure is informed, above all, by powerful 
conservative political forces. A dense institutional apparatus served as the pretext to dismiss the 
need for a human rights ombudsman. In contrast, progressive forces argued that such a body was 
essential. In the end, progressives and conservatives compromised on legislation that mirrored 
the international template closely; it included almost everything strongly recommended in the 
Paris Principles, but excluded other features that were common in Latin America but not strongly 
recommended in the international template.. Chile’s NHRI incorporated safeguards strongly 
recommended in the Paris Principles, but left out the weakly recommended complaint-handling 
mechanism.156 In related work, we explain how legislative debate centered on the Paris 
Principles, and how the Chilean government pointed to the international template to justify key 
omissions, notably the exclusion of complaint-handling.157 We also document civil society 
activists and UN officials, including the UN Representative of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights in Latin America who took the unusual position of arguing against the adoption of 
the UN-promulgated Paris Principles, and in favor of regional models.158 
Nevertheless, these advocates lost, and the legislation does not grant the NHRI an explicit 
mandate to receive, process, investigate, or adopt recommendations with respect to individual 
complaints. Opponents to complaint-handling continue to assert that Chile’s institutional 
framework sufficiently robust. Others claim that the absence of formal authorization does not 
preclude effective complaint-handling. However, as the next section details, the Chilean 
experience throws such claims into doubt. Evidence supports the counterfactual claim that 
explicit provision for complaint-handling is likely to have significantly enhanced the impact of 
the Chilean Institute. 
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2. The impact of limited investigative powers on the Chilean NHRI 
 
The INDH is not without investigative prerogatives. Notably, the Institute can initiate 
legal action before the courts with regard to five specific crimes: genocide, crimes against 
humanity, torture, forced disappearances, and illegal trafficking of migrants.159 The INDH has 
pursued multiple legal actions in defense of torture victims, with notable success.160 It has also, 
on its own initiative, interpreted its mandate to successfully launch a program of prison visits, 
including in response to complaints received by prisoners themselves. Civil society actors 
consider this work significant, especially in a context of impunity.161 Outside of a proscribed set 
of egregious violations, the powers of the Institute lie principally in the arena of agenda setting. 
The INDH has begun to experiment with expanding its remit beyond the strict parameters of its 
founding legislation, notably emulating practices developed by the Peruvian Ombudsman, 
including observation of social protests and initiating an ambitious decentralization program in 
2015. Such efforts may help justify a formalization of complaint-handling powers. However, 
decentralization of operations, coupled with an absence of complaint-handling powers outside a 
proscribed set of crimes, may also generate negative feedback effects: above all, the inflated 
expectations of individuals seeking out the INDH as a venue of last resort, only to find that it can 
offer little meaningful redress. 
The lack of explicit complaint-handling powers has posed significant challenges. In the 
end, the INDH can do little more than report the violation to the responsible state official. As one 
observer put it: “Because the law is ambiguous, the actions of the INDH are also ambiguous.”162 
The INDH is sensitive to this concern. In response, it has interpreted the instruction contained in 
Article 3(6) to “receive any information” as also including reception of complaints. A Citizens 
Attention Unit was established in 2015 and has begun to issue reports on complaints received, 
reporting 1,760 complaints attended to in the first half of the year.163 The largest set of cases 
(431) refers to maladministration, principally involving detainees and public service provision. 
The second largest set of cases (373) refers to historical violations.  
The incipient practice of receiving complaints leads some NHRI officials to dismiss the 
absence of explicit complaint-handling authority as a “non-issue.”164 However, the volume of 
complaints received are strikingly low when compared to complaint volumes in Peru and other 
Latin American states whose NHRIs have formal complaint-handling mandates. Moreover, no 
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information is provided on complaint supervision, follow-up, or resolution. The INDH has used 
legal writs to partially circumvent this deficit, but only with respect to the specified crime of 
torture, with other violations of varying gravity falling by the wayside. Indeed, in 2010 the NHRI 
rejected official designation as the National Preventive Mechanism under the Optional Protocol 
to the Convention Against Torture (OPCAT) due to formal shortcomings.165 
Formal structure limitations are acknowledged not only by NHRI staff, but also by the 
human rights community. Recognizing the important role of the INDH, Amnesty International 
(AI) nevertheless has called on the Bachelet government to establish a human rights ombudsman, 
noting the INDH’s “continuing limitations, for example, the fact it can only pursue judicial 
actions in relation to those concrete cases defined by law.”166 Recent proposals to establish a 
sector-specific children’s ombudsman, as well as an antidiscrimination body, also point to INDH 
deficiencies. Draft legislation for the children’s ombudsman, tabled in 2015, was criticized for 
not contemplating “an autonomous complaints and claims system for children.”167 Domingo 
Lovera continues: “An ‘individual complaints’ [system] . . . can ensure that the voice of children 
is heard within our institutions.168 Exactly the principle problem affecting this group, is that for 
them the state administration is, generally, closed.” In a study contemplating the creation of an 
antidiscrimination body, Albert Coddou McManus and Tomás Vial Solar argue that the INDH 
could take on this function but it would require legislative reform granting the body “powers or 
investigative faculties [and] reception of complaints or individual issues.”169 In short, when 
NHRI allies criticize the body and call for replacement institutions with complaint-handling 
powers, this underscores the importance of complaint-handling structures. 
Specifically, observers highlight an important deficit in Chile’s protection framework for 
human rights infractions that are not necessarily justiciable. Many of the complaints received by 
the INDH in 2015 fall into this category, including the withdrawal of welfare benefits to 
detainees, delays in pension administration, and medical negligence.170 In response, INDH 
officials point to the density of the institutional apparatus in Chile as providing significant, if not 
sufficient, pathways to remedy.171 However, agencies such as the Ministry of Interior, the pro 
bono Judicial Assistance branch, and the Nacional Service for the Consumer (SERNAC), may 
have nominal jurisdiction over human rights issues, but in reality they provide few effective 
remedies.172 Unlike in Peru, the Chilean NHRI also cannot rely on a highly mobilized human 
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rights community to engage in complaint supervision or effectively counter political backlash.173 
As one former INDH functionary puts it: 
 
The problem is acute in all of the cases which the INDH chooses not to take up or 
supervise, and there exist thousands of such cases in the country. In the background, no 
state institution exists which can take up many of these complaints, placing these 
individuals in a situation of absolute vulnerability.174 
 
INDH officials do acknowledge such protection gaps, but insist that an obligation to 
receive and attend all individual complaints would quickly overwhelm their limited resources.175 
This is a valid concern. Indicative of powerful opposition, the Institute was initially assigned 
$2.3 million in 2010, but Congress allocated 34 percent less than the sum requested in 2011 and 
imposed further budget cuts in 2013. The absence of investigative powers has also likely had 
other negative effects, including hamstringing the INDH during budget negotiations. Many 
human rights ombudsmen, as evidenced in Peru, have seized upon their statutory requirement to 
attend to growing caseloads as necessitating greater resource allocation. 
Opposition by conservative factions within Congress stems from the robust advocacy by 
the INDH on a wide range of high profile rights issues.176 In response, the institution has been 
subject to severe attacks. In May 2016, members of the right-wing Independent Democratic 
Union (UDI) party declared that the “human rights which [INDH Director] Señora Fríes 
promotes only serve to defend delinquents and masked men.”177 Subtler, but no less insidious 
attacks, have also been produced by private think tanks.178 Severe critiques of the limited 
effectiveness of the NHRI persist, in spite of a relatively favorable political environment. The 
INDH currently has a high-profile supporter in President Michelle Bachelet (2014–2018), as 
indicated by the appointment of a highly credible individual as the new INDH Director in 
2016.179 However, a latent concern also arising from the absence of an explicit obligation to 
receive complaints focuses on INDH responsiveness being overly dependent upon the discretion 
of its executive (the Council and Directorship). The first Director, Dr. Lorena Fríes (2010–2016), 
is widely viewed as having performed well. However, the risk of capture is heightened by the 
fact that, similar to the Peruvian case, the INDH has been a lightning rod for political 
controversy. 
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Our Chilean case study provides a powerful counterpoint to the Peruvian experience in 
highlighting the negative impact of omitting formal provisions of investigation, particularly 
complaint-handling. To be exact, individual complaints handling is formally limited to very 
grave violations—and it is only in these areas, notably torture, where the INDH has acted 
forcefully. Coupled with a highly restrictive mandate, this formal omission has hindered the 
ability of the Institute to consolidate its public profile as an accessible and effective rights 
protector. The NHRI has demonstrated ingenuity in seeking to overcome formal limitations. The 
absence of complaint-handling has made it difficult, however, for the Chilean office to execute 
basic functions, let alone expand its mandate or resist budget cuts. Observers also highlight 
additional vulnerabilities, including political pressure being brought to bear on the selection of 
cases and public disillusionment as individuals learn that the Institute cannot help them. In 
contrast to Peru where complaint-handling has served as a powerful instrument for consolidating 
profile and countering negative feedback, the Chilean NHRI has been denied this pathway to 
institutionalization. The study now turns to a different set of cases to examine the importance of 
a quite different set of formal provisions. 
 
D. NHRIs With and Without Promotion Safeguards in the Asia-Pacific Region 
 
We next turn to paired comparisons in the Asia-Pacific region, to study the presence (and 
absence) of promotive functions. Whereas our quantitative results revealed a robust correlation 
between investigatory powers and NHRI effectiveness, patterns were more mixed regarding 
promotive functions. Nevertheless, we investigate promotive functions through case studies, both 
because regressions can fail to reveal effects that only occur under particular circumstances, and 
because the UN Paris Principles place such emphasis on promotive powers. 
We start with Malaysia. In this case, the NHRI was set up by an authoritarian regime in 
response to international pressure and there was little expectation that the office would be 
effective. Nevertheless, the NHRI was given all three promotive powers we study. Promotive 
powers came into fashion through the 1991 Paris Principles.180 Malaysia activated its NHRI soon 
thereafter, in 1999. They may have acceded to the international template because the governing 
regime did not see promotive powers as major threats. Nevertheless, we find that in this case, 
promotive powers allowed the NHRI to generate significant publicity around human rights 
concerns, even under adverse circumstances. However, it has proven more difficult to convert 
publicity into concrete reforms.  
We also include the Philippines as a shadow case, to create a counterfactual and explore a 
similar commission without extensive promotive powers. The Philippine NHRI was set up in a 
setting that was no more hostile than the Malaysian context, and was generally similar in design. 
However, because it was activated in 1987, before the Paris Principles made promotive functions 
fashionable, it lacked a mandate to advise on legislation or to produce reports. Shadow cases 
should be selected so they differ on the main independent variable of interest, but are otherwise 
similar (see Table 6). The two NHRIs have comparable investigatory powers, but the Malaysian 
NHRI established after Paris has more extensive promotion powers. 
That said, because case studies are never perfectly matched, and the number of cases is 
always small, we present them not to make robust causal inferences, but rather to probe the 
plausibility of the proposed mechanisms. A potential complication with our research design is 
that countries that established NHRIs before the international community pushed for them might 
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have been more committed to seeing them succeed. Practically, this means that if anything, we 
should expect the Philippine NHRI to be more effective than its Malaysian counterpart, 
something that would lead us to underestimate (rather than overestimate) the effects of NHRI 
institutional safeguards. 
 
TABLE 6 
CASE STUDY OVERVIEW 
 
 
Date  Region Office Type 
Independence 
Safeguards 
Investigatory 
Powers 
Promotional 
Functions 
Malaysia 1999 
Asia-
Pacific 
Commission 3 5 3 
Philippines 1987 
Asia-
Pacific 
Commission 2 5 1 
 
Our case studies allow us to show how institutional safeguards can be employed in 
different contexts, depending upon the commitment of NHRI leaders and opportunities 
encountered in governing structures. As summarized in Table 7, the Malaysian NHRI has 
produced a broad range of highly critical reports, ensuring media coverage, and facilitating civil 
society mobilization. Promotional activities have caused significant upset to ruling regimes, 
provoking strongly worded criticism. A lack of strong independence safeguards has led to 
outspoken commissioners being removed or their terms not renewed, and the NHRI had suffered 
multiple budget cuts. Despite adversity, the NHRI nevertheless has won some modest, but 
important, reform victories. 
In contrast, in the Philippines, a lack of promotional protections has led the NHRI to 
focus on a different route to change—facilitating the prosecution of abuse perpetrators. This 
uphill battle produced few results. When one ambitious NHRI head briefly experimented with an 
alternative promotional strategy—as pursued in Malaysia—he was shut down by the country’s 
Supreme Court, which found that the NHRI had exceeded its mandate. 
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TABLE 7 
SUMMARY OF ASIA PACIFIC CASE STUDIES 
 
 
Human Rights Commission 
of Malaysia (Suhakam) 
Philippines Commission on 
Human Rights (CHR) 
Promotional powers 
possessed by the 
office? 
Advise on legislation; annual 
reports; education and 
promotion. 
Education and promotion. 
Why does the NHRI 
have (or lack) 
promotional powers? 
Malaysia copied new global 
model (Paris Principles) which 
requires NHRIs to possess a 
range of promotional powers. 
No global model was available 
in 1987—so Philippines NHRI 
designers drew inspiration 
from public prosecutor model 
Does the NHRI make 
use of its powers to 
advise on legislation, 
issue reports, and 
promote human rights 
education? 
Yes. Promotional activities 
have been a centerpiece of the 
NHRIs activities since it began 
operations in April 2000. It has 
leveraged annual reports to 
generate political impact. 
Yes. In the one area where 
NHRI has promotional powers 
(education), NHRI has been 
active. However, with some 
exceptions, widely viewed as 
having underperformed. 
Do local actors 
attribute NHRI 
success/failure to 
presence (or absence) 
of promotional 
safeguard? 
Yes. Observers highlight how 
promotional campaigns have 
forced the hand of government 
(eventually) to address 
systemic violations, as well as 
providing a bridge between the 
state and civil society. 
However, others express 
frustration at government 
stonewalling. 
Yes. Observers attribute 
challenges confronted by 
NHRI to a legalistic approach 
adopted by successive 
chairpersons borne of a formal 
design weighted toward a 
prosecutorial model of 
intervention.  
How does government 
respond to NHRI use 
of its promotional 
powers? 
The NHRI has confronted 
official indifference and 
backlash, especially on security 
concerns. Progress has been 
observed in other areas (e.g., 
indigenous rights). The NHRI 
adeptly exploited the political 
opening presented by the 2008 
elections to press its advantage. 
Government has been 
intermittently receptive to 
education mandate, especially 
training of security personnel. 
However, the office has 
encountered robust resistance 
from the courts. Severe budget 
cuts in 1997 and scheduled for 
2017 are also indicative of a 
lack of political support. 
Does 
presence/absence of 
promotional powers 
create virtuous/vicious 
feedback loops? 
Yes. Effective use of its 
promotional mandate has 
emboldened NHRI leadership 
and set expectations vis-à-vis 
domestic support 
constituencies. Promotional 
activities have reinforced the 
Yes. Absence of robust 
promotional powers has 
weakened NHRI in terms of 
accountability and popular 
credibility. Experimentation 
with promotional mandate in 
1994 subject to official 
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credibility of the office, but 
they have also provoked 
official hostility. 
backlash, prompting a retreat 
from such activity until 2008. 
 
E. The Malaysian Human Rights Commission 
 
The autocratic government of Mahathir Mohamad (1981–2003) established the Human 
Rights Commission (Suhakam) in 1999, amidst growing domestic pressure for public 
accountability.181 The Malaysian NHRI displays important formal limitations, especially in terms 
of independence safeguards. Nevertheless, it has deployed a broad suite of promotional functions 
to, at times, effectively mobilize human rights concerns at the domestic level. Described as a 
“genuinely new institutional initiative in accountability,” the office has adopted positions 
markedly different to government on a range of human rights issues.182 In contrast to the 
Philippine experience, robust promotional powers have enabled the Malaysian NHRI to engage 
in a broad array of high-impact activities and deflect political attacks. Third party mobilization, 
individual leadership, and international pressure emerge as important additional factors in 
explaining the relative success of the Malaysian office. 
 
1. Explaining the robust promotional powers of the Malaysian NHRI 
 
Suhakam is established in legislation and includes a mandate to promote human rights 
through education: advise on legislation; recommend ratification of international instruments; 
and issue reports based on public inquiries.183 Receptiveness to international pressure is apparent. 
By 1999, the Paris Principles were widely accepted as the benchmark standard for NHRI design. 
As Amanda Whiting remarks, “Malaysia could have claimed to conform to those standards or 
argued against them, but it was unthinkable to ignore them.”184 
Despite declarations by the foreign minister at the time that Suhakam “was firmly based 
on the Paris Principles,”185 the office displays a number of restrictions that are problematic from 
a Paris Principles-compliance perspective. It is unique among NHRIs in initially granting only a 
two-year term in office with no security of tenure; it is accountable to the minister of foreign 
affairs; appointment is on recommendation of the prime minister; and it labors under a restricted 
human rights mandate (those rights included in Part II of the Constitution).186 
Government may have viewed Suhakam as principally an international public relations 
exercise. However, NHRI adoption in Malaysia would also be informed by the popular demands 
of civil society to rein in rampant abuses of state power.187 The creation of Suhakam was 
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announced in March 1999; by July, legislation to establish the Human Rights Commission was 
before parliament; and it opened its doors in early 2000. The pace of legislative developments, 
and lack of consultation, aroused suspicions about government motive—but also spurred on civil 
society organizations to closely scrutinize the NHRI, a practice which has persisted. Observers 
initially held out little hope for Suhakam.188 However, as documented in the next section, the fate 
of the NHRI has proven more complex (and more compelling) than many would have predicted. 
This is largely due to the astute activation of formal promotional powers in the face of 
governmental resistance to independent scrutiny. 
 
2. The impact of robust promotional powers on the Malaysian NHRI 
 
Promotional activities have been a centerpiece of Suhakam activities since it began 
operations in April 2000. Suhakam has made particularly good use of its explicit power to 
publish special reports based on public inquiries. In an early signal of autonomy, Suhakam issued 
a special report in mid-2001 on Freedom of Assembly, calling for the abolition of police permits 
at public rallies in the context of a draconian Internal Security Act (ISA). Prime Minister 
Mahathir strongly criticized the report for ignoring security concerns. Its review of the ISA was 
widely circulated within NGO and UN forums with some advocates calling it an “incredible 
report.”189 
A series of public inquiries from 2006 to 2009 have impacted the media, with Suhakam 
documenting human rights abuses and making robust recommendations to the authorities. This 
included issues of deaths in custody, freedom of assembly, excessive force by police, unlawful 
arrest, and violations of indigenous rights by transnational corporations.190 Having established its 
credibility, Suhakam has also used the threat of public inquiries to spur public authorities such as 
the police into action, with commissioners stating that the court of public opinion is “more 
powerful than any court.”191 
Suhakam has also made inroads into activating its legislative advisory function. The 
Commission was consulted in the passing of the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Bill in May 2007. It 
was involved in a 2001 amendment to the Constitution that introduced gender into the list of 
discrimination prohibitions. However, it has been notably less successful in achieving ratification 
of international human rights treaties.192 Indicative of official resistance, when Suhakam 
organized a “closed-door discussion” on the ISA in 2008 with relevant government agencies, all 
the officials declined to attend.193 
The NHRI has actively pursued its human rights promotion and education function, 
regularly organizing workshops and conducting road shows throughout the national territory to 
raise awareness on human rights and the role of Suhakam.194 Importantly, it has expanded its 
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promotional activities beyond the civil-political to include social, economic, and cultural rights 
that fall outside its jurisdiction, not being in the Constitution or regarded as justiciable in 
Malaysia. Indeed, it has sought to redress what it views as an “imbalance,” arguing “both sets of 
rights need to be treated with equal importance.”195 It has also sought to inculcate human rights 
norms among public officials through training programs. 
In 2012, Suhakam launched its most audacious promotional campaign yet, undertaking 
its first national public inquiry into land rights of indigenous people.196 National public inquiries 
are non-judicial inquiries into systemic or widespread human rights abuses. As Meg Brodie 
notes, “all national inquiries seek to create change: to stop systemic or widespread abuse, and to 
encourage the internalization of human rights norms.”197 In short, they are perhaps an NHRI’s 
most powerful promotional instrument. Over the course of two years, Suhakam sought to 
“examine the root causes of the problems relating to native customary right to land and to 
recommend appropriate solutions to the problem.”198 A highly detailed report was published in 
2013, receiving significant domestic and international coverage.199 The prime minister’s cabinet 
announced in June 2015 the establishment of a Cabinet Committee to oversee implementation of 
recommendations stemming from the inquiry.200 
Civil society observers and experts highlight the importance of formal promotional 
powers in understanding the positive impact of the Malaysian NHRI. At the same time, progress 
has been subject to government stonewalling, with the NHRI initially labeled a “toothless tiger” 
by some in the NGO community.201 Civil society observers give the NHRI a mixed score card 
through its first decade in operation. While it robustly intervened on issues of legal protections 
and the rule of law, it was more reticent to involve itself in investigating human rights violations 
in the context of political freedoms, ethnic conflict, and religious conflict.202 Relations between 
some human rights organizations and Suhakam have, at times, been characterized by hostility 
from both sides.203 However, other NGOs have acknowledged Suhakam “as a bridge between us 
and the establishment.”204 
The variable success of the NHRI over time has also been significantly marked by the 
ebb and flow of highly committed leadership. Suhakam did defy expectations in the period 
immediately following its inception. In part, this can be attributed to the appointment of former 
Deputy Prime Minister Musa bin Hitam (1999–2002) as chair. Musa was Malaysia’s special 
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envoy to the UN, leading the Malaysian delegation to the UN Commission on Human Rights 
from 1993 to 1998. Despite a record of robustly defending the government’s rejection of the 
“western perception” of human rights,205 Musa emerged as a surprisingly vocal rights advocate, 
especially regarding abuses by security personnel. Motivated Suhakam commissioners have 
invoked their governing law to pursue impactful promotional activities. However, other 
commissioners have been content to do little or sought to ingratiate themselves “as a partner of 
the government.”206 
Commission inquiries have rarely enjoyed the support of government officials, with 
relations characterized more by indifference and conflict. The Malaysian political elite has 
traditionally adopted a hostile stance toward international human rights norms, as indicated by a 
poor ratification record. Notwithstanding, in the words of one observer, “Suhakam certainly . . . 
launched headlong into its educational function and pride[d] itself on raising public awareness of 
human-rights issues.”207 This is significant. However, while Suhakam “has been given the 
freedom to conduct its activities” that “is also where it ends.”208 
An audacious beginning inevitably provoked backlash. The first indication of 
government pushback came with the appointment of Abu Talib Othman as chair in 2002. A 
former attorney general with a problematic rule of law record, his appointment was greeted with 
dismay by the NGO community.209 In anticipation of Othman’s arrival, one final act by the 
Commission had been to begin experimenting with its public inquiry power. Published in 2001, 
the first inquiry’s highly critical finding of excessive use of force by police against peaceful 
demonstrators was widely publicized.210 The commissioners responsible for the inquiry did not 
have their terms renewed.211 Other outspoken commissioners were similarly removed.212 In a 
further effort to muzzle the NHRI, the majority government party blocked discussion of 
Suhakam’s first annual report in parliament—a practice which persists to this day.213 
Relations with civil society during this period became fraught with Suhakam reassigned 
to the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister’s Department in 2004, raising doubts over its 
autonomy.214 However, by the end of the decade the political winds were again blowing against 
the ruling National Front coalition. In 2008, the National Front retained power but suffered its 
biggest loss in electoral history. Observers put the result down to growing popular discontent 
over the failure of institutions like Suhakam to safeguard human rights and democracy.215 
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Notwithstanding its subdued public presence, the Commission began to flex its promotional 
muscles again as the 2008 elections approached.216 
The decisive break for the NHRI came in 2008 with its reaccreditation at the UN up for 
renewal. This review served as a powerful focal point for mobilization by international and 
domestic supporters of an office that had raised expectations through effective promotional 
activities. Caught between domestic pressures for reform, a well-orchestrated campaign by 
Suhakam commissioners, alongside supportive local NGOs, and international calls for Paris 
Principles compliance, the Malaysian government eventually relented, legislating for significant 
changes to the NHRI’s appointment procedures and extension of commissioners’ term limits to 
three years.217 A new intake of commissioners in 2009 also gave cause for optimism, with all 
appointees coming from NGO backgrounds with the exception of the Chair, Tan Sri Hasmy 
Agam. Formally the government’s Permanent Representative to the UN in New York, Hasmy 
nevertheless quickly demonstrated his commitment to independence and, importantly, began to 
deliver results. To many observers’ surprise, Hasmy proved to be a committed and effective 
NHRI leader; according to a leading NHRI practitioner, “once appointed he took the role he was 
supposed to fulfill very seriously.”218 
Astute use of promotional powers by the Commission post-2009 within a more benign 
political climate has produced important feedback loops, and marked the rebirth of an effective 
Suhakam. In 2011, a coalition of NGOs organized a mass rally calling for electoral reform, 
dubbed “Bersih 2.0.” Leading up to the rally, Suhakam issued robust statements in support of 
freedom of assembly and criticized the government’s ban. In response to allegations of police 
violence, the Commission opened a public inquiry and, in a novel move, the Royal Malaysian 
Police (RMP) pledged their full cooperation.219 In response to allegations of violations in a 
repeat rally in 2012, dubbed “Bersih 3.0,” the Commission opened another public inquiry. The 
final report strongly criticized the police, but also called upon demonstrators to act lawfully.220 
Notably, during the “Bersih 4.0” of 2015, although once again declared illegal, the RMP 
conducted themselves peaceably on this occasion.221 As one NGO observer notes: 
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These public inquiries [into the Bersih campaign] mattered because it engaged with an 
issue on a national scale. . . . I commend Suhakam for responding in a very timely 
manner to the issues, the critical issues which are gripping the country.222 
 
Improved standing in international and domestic non-governmental circles appears to 
have also been noticed by government, with the minister for parliamentary affairs accepting “in 
principle” that Suhakam’s annual report should be discussed in plenary.223 The attorney general’s 
chamber invited the Commission to advise on draft legislation, including the 2011 Public 
Assembly Bill and the Security Offices (Special Measures) Act (SOSMA).224 ISA was finally 
repealed in 2012, replaced by SOSMA. Suhakam has cautiously welcomed this development.225 
The Commission has also been instrumental in getting the government to withdraw reservations 
from the Convention on the Rights of the Child and Convention on the Elimination of all Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women and in 2010 issued its strongest statements yet on Malaysia’s 
poor ratification record: 
 
Personally, I’ve always felt it’s embarrassing that Malaysia has yet to ratify these 
conventions, especially the Convention Against Torture. We cannot condone torture. It’s 
a long-haul fight. We will continue to engage with the government. I’ll be happy if the 
government is willing to come on board.226 
 
However, once again, Suhakam confronts a hostile government in a deteriorating rights 
context under the administration of Prime Minister Najib Razak (2009–present).227 Slippage in 
civil and political protections is apparent with the passage of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 
(2015). Suhakam has not shied away from confrontation.228 In late 2015, the government 
announced that Suhakam’s budget would be cut by 50 percent.229 Many observers concur that 
this likely the government sending the message “don’t bite the hand that feeds you.”230 However, 
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many actors, both domestic and international,231 have rallied to Suhakam’s defense and mounting 
pressure may have had some effect.232 As the director of a prominent Malaysian NGO states: 
 
After 15 years of struggle, Suhakam has obtained some degree of recognition by 
Malaysians. While their success was not without flaws, the impact they have in the 
human rights discourse in Malaysia cannot be dismissed easily.233 
 
Our case study illustrates that the qualified successes of the Malaysian NHRI have been 
achieved despite adverse background conditions, and despite circumscribed independence 
safeguards. Ambitious NHRI commissioners have made use of extensive promotional powers to 
introduce diverse human rights issues onto the national agenda, forcing the legislature and the 
executive to respond, empowering like-minded civil society and international actors, and on 
occasion, when openings in the governing regime have appeared, shaping important legislative 
initiatives. At the same time, the NHRI has not consistently been able to translate extensive 
publicity into concrete actions, and has on occasion, and appropriately in our view, been 
recommended for downgrade to “B” within the peer review process.  
 
F. Philippine Commission on Human Rights 
 
We next turn to the Philippines to create a counterfactual, where the NHRI lacks 
extensive promotional powers, because it was established shortly before the Paris Principles 
popularized these powers. Even though the Philippine NHRI was set up under no less hospitable 
circumstances than in Malaysia, and had additional independence safeguards, it was unable to 
mobilize national opinion as effectively as the Malaysian NHRI. This is, in part, because of its 
formal structure; when an entrepreneurial NHRI head experimented with expanding promotional 
activities, the Philippine Supreme Court shut down this strategy, by ruling that the NHRI had 
exceeded its jurisdiction. Philippine NHRI leaders turned their energies to other strategies—
above all, helping the legal system with human rights investigations—where the NHRI has some 
limited, but clearly established institutional competencies. This alternative pathway was 
unsuccessful, however.  
 
1. Explaining the limited promotional powers of the Philippine NHRI 
 
The Philippine Commission on Human Rights (CHR) was established in May 1987, in 
the wake of the overthrow of the Marcos dictatorship (1972-86). It embodies the strong emphasis 
placed in the new 1987 constitution on civil liberties.234 The design of the CHR is oriented 
toward legal protection, vested with the power to cite individuals for contempt of court, provide 
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legal aid to individuals, access all places of detention, provide compensation to victims, and 
grant immunity from prosecution.235  
On the promotive side, the CHR lacks explicit powers to produce reports or advise on 
legislation. It is directed to “[e]stablish a continuing program of research, education, and 
information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights” and further promotional 
prerogatives can be inferred from a mandate to “[r]ecommend to the Congress effective 
measures to promote human rights . . . ” and to “[m]onitor the Philippine Government’s 
compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights.”236 During the 1986 debate on 
the CHR law, Commissioner Rosario Braid expressed concern at the lack of specificity on CHR 
promotional powers.237 However, the bill sponsors argued that reference to “a continuing 
program of education” was sufficient.238 A legal control mandate is further emphasized in the 
requirement that a majority of commissioners be members of the bar.239 
A combination of domestic and international drivers contributed to the government’s 
decision to establish the first NHRI in Southeast Asia. The CHR was a direct response to what 
happened in the Marcos era, as stated by one of the bill’s sponsors in the 1986 congressional 
deliberations: “The commission has a very specific function which is the protection of civil and 
political rights. Due to the experience of fourteen years of martial rule, we want to . . . provide 
this very specific body with the function to ensure the safeguarding of these rights.”240 Reflecting 
domestic demand, in its first year of operation, the Presidential Commission on Human Rights 
(PCHR) had already begun receiving complaints, including seven hundred cases of alleged 
human rights violations filed by the leading NGO, Task Force Detainees of the Philippines 
(TFDP).241 
In contrast to the Malaysian experience, established six years prior to UN endorsement of 
the Paris Principles, international influence on CHR design is marginal. Deliberations were 
influenced by a 1984 UN resolution, but this only provides a blanket recommendation to 
establish or strengthen such institutions.242 One of the first official acts of President Corazon C. 
Aquino (1987–1992) was to establish the PCHR in 1986, succeeded by the CHR a year later. 
Reflecting the personal commitment of the executive to the CHR, legislative drafters were highly 
expert, chaired by a Supreme Court Justice. However, lacking international guidelines and 
informed by their legal formalist training, the resulting CHR is an awkward fusion of omitted 
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promotional powers, investigative prerogatives, and no enforcement authority. As the next 
section examines, the prosecutorial orientation of the CHR, while not precluding promotional 
activities, has led to pushback to alleged agency overreach and powerfully shaped the working 
practices of the organization. 
 
2. The impact of limited promotional powers on the Philippine NHRI 
 
A formal orientation toward a prosecution function has had a powerful impact on the 
activities of the Philippine NHRI. Against a backdrop of rampant human rights violations and 
serious failings in the Philippine judicial system, it is unsurprising that the CHR would orientate 
itself in this direction, neglecting its limited promotional faculties. Initially, the Department of 
Justice regularly deputized CHR lawyers to assist in the prosecution of human rights cases. CHR 
personnel dutifully filed 1,509 cases of alleged human rights violations before the courts between 
1987 and 1990. However, the CHR faced a formidable obstacle in the form of rampant judicial 
misconduct. Only eleven cases resulted in sanctions against the perpetrators.243 After three years 
of operation, the CHR could “boast few real results.”244  
Compared to the Malaysian NHRI, the CHR’s promotional remit lacks specificity and 
omits key powers. As a result, the Philippine office initially made little use of its promotional 
authority. It was conspicuously silent on high profile human rights violations, including the 
notorious 1987 Lupao Massacre. The CHR claimed that it could not investigate such abuses “in 
an environment of war.”245 The CHR also became bogged down in legal petitions, including 
private disputes over property and theft, quickly draining the institution of strategic direction. 
Observers lamented this strategic decision, especially when “[p]rivate persons are subject 
anyway to existing laws on prosecution of criminal offenders.”246 
Civil society observers became exasperated with an NHRI lacking enforcement authority 
and apparently unwilling to experiment with its limited promotional remit. The Commission had 
lost precious time to establish its credentials: 
 
Although the CHR may be able to regroup its forces after several early political snafus, 
precious time has been lost. The Commission has few recommendations for prosecution 
and even fewer convictions to show for hundreds of complaints received. . . . Acting 
effectively, the CHR could have a tremendous impact in the Philippines today by 
exposing perpetrators of human rights abuses and, thereby, deterring future abuses.247 
  
Formal limitations on human rights promotion was compounded by poor CHR 
leadership. The first Chair, Mary Concepcion Bautista (1988–1992), a criminal litigator by 
training, endorsed a legalistic paradigm in CHR operations. Bautista also quickly lost credibility. 
In response to a critical Amnesty International report, Bautista falsely claimed that “[t]here are 
no political prisoners in the Philippines because the Aquino government does not tolerate human 
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rights violations.”248 In reality, violations, and especially forced disappearances, had markedly 
increased compared to 1987.249 Such problematic conduct did not go unnoticed.250 
Legal formalism among CHR professionals also hampered the NHRI’s potential 
effectiveness. The vast majority of personnel recruited by Bautista entered from the legal 
profession, establishing a particular community of practice. Many CHR lawyers were ill-
disposed to conduct investigations into human rights crimes.251 As Abraham Sarmiento observes, 
“[i]n those exceptional cases that the CHR sets out to the fields the CHR has been noted for a 
lack of ‘vigor’ in finding out the truth.”252 Former Commissioner Paulynn Sicam recalls being 
the only non-lawyer in the CHR when she joined the CHR in 1991: “They gave me information 
and education. “You are not a lawyer, so we will give you a non-lawyer’s job. They looked down 
on me because I wasn’t a lawyer.”253 In short, a formal mandate that emphasized investigation 
and deemphasized promotion shaped early hiring in favor of lawyers.  
Marginal to CHR strategic priorities, ironically the new office for public information and 
education “turned out to be the most active branch of the commission.”254 This area of activity 
was even met with some receptiveness by the authorities, with CHR police human rights training 
becoming mandatory in 1995. A Memorandum of Understanding to establish an Inter-Agency 
Chamber of Human Rights was signed in 1995 between the Department of Justice, the 
Department of National Defence, and the Department of the Interior. Human Rights Action 
Centers were established in around 42,000 villages nationwide. Through creative expansion of a 
limited education mandate, the CHR had “found a way to actually overcome those limitations . . . 
contained formally in our charter.”255 This activity was so successful that the Commission even 
received the 1994 UNESCO Prize for the Teaching of Human Rights.256 
However, expanding promotional activity confronted serious challenges. Some observers 
questioned whether training of security personnel was the best use of resources, when it could be 
used for “mobilizing training organisations such as the academe and NGOs; and monitoring, 
advocacy and public reporting . . . .”257 Alleged violations by the police remained high 
throughout this period.258 
While the NHRI’s charter included one promotional function—education—it lacked two 
other powers often found in other NHRI charters: the power to advise on legislation, and to 
produce annual reports. In terms of advising on legislation, the office had no formal jurisdiction 
and there is little evidence of CHR impact on human rights law during this period. The death 
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penalty was reinstated in 1993 and progressively expanded to a range of offenses until a 
moratorium was declared in 2000. The government took few effective steps to reform the police, 
military, or judicial system.259 The CHR did develop a practice of occasionally preparing reports 
despite being under no formal obligation. However, reports appeared erratically and were not 
published for public scrutiny, a practice which has persisted.260 
The CHR’s lacklustre performance was doubly frustrating for NGO observers given that 
the Aquino administration offered a window of opportunity for human rights advocacy with 
implicit governmental support. This window would be firmly shut with the arrival of Aquino’s 
successor, President Fidel Ramos (1992–1998). A former chief-of-staff of the armed forces, 
Ramos was himself accused of abuses during the period of martial law under Marcos. Although 
civil and political rights violations decreased slightly under Ramos, violations of vulnerable 
groups surged.261 
However, as government support for human rights faded, the CHR was about to 
dramatically rediscover its mission under new leadership. A former Ambassador to the United 
Nations and a recognized “human rights advocate,”262 Sedfrey Ordoñez (1992–1995) became 
CHR chairperson in 1992 following the sudden death of Bautista. He brought with him a deep 
understanding of the internal machinery of government. Change in direction was evident early 
on. With political prisoners once again a hot button issue in 1993, Ramos’s administration 
erroneously credited the CHR with asserting that “there have been no new cases of political 
detention since July 1992. . . .” In contrast to his predecessor, Ordoñez was quick to repudiate the 
official statement and confirm the statistics of the campaigning NGO, the TFDP.263 Nevertheless, 
relations with Ramos also likely involved some complicated political footwork, with Ordoñez 
publicly endorsing the president’s record on other occasions.264 Under Ordoñez, the CHR issued 
a series of hard-hitting special reports into systemic violations on the basis of a wide range of 
human rights investigations.265 In 1994, Ordoñez announced that “the commission will intensify 
its human rights education campaign” despite budget limitations.266 He also used his connections 
to solicit the cooperation of allies within the state.267 
However, the CHR’s formal limitations would prove to be the undoing of this short-lived 
experiment. Just as Ordoñez was expanding the Commission’s promotional mandate, the 
Supreme Court intervened to clip his wings. In January 1994, the Court ruled that the CHR’s 
founding law limited the body to investigating civil and political rights only.268 Dispute centered 
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on the deliberations of the constitutional drafters in 1986, with the CHR claiming that “it was not 
the intention of the (Constitutional) Commission to create only a paper tiger limited only to civil 
and political rights.” However, the Supreme Court disagreed, noting that “it is readily apparent 
that the delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to 
the more severe cases of human rights violations.” 269 The lone dissenting opinion of Justice 
Teodoro Padilla argued that, regardless, “the CHR should be given a wide latitude to look into 
and investigate situations which may (or may not ultimately) involve human rights violations.”270  
As a parting shot, in late 1995, Ordoñez issued Resolution No. A95-069 stating CHR 
operational priorities as: “investigative monitoring of incidents and/or conditions obtaining in the 
country which are violative of concerns in both areas of civil and political rights and economic, 
social and cultural rights [ESCR].” However, speaking in 2008, then CHR Chairperson Leila de 
Lima, laments how “[the CHR’s] powers in relation to ESCR in general . . . have been 
considerably curtailed by jurisprudence.” She goes on, “we are unfazed by the Simon decision, 
we intend to pursue the issue and challenge this again in the courts.”271 A proposed new 
legislative charter for the CHR “would elaborate and make [the ESCR mandate] more specific . . 
. so that there are no more arguments on the matter.”272 Reflecting on this episode, former 
Commissioner Sicam recalls: “We always wanted to be bigger than we were, because . . . people 
came to us with all sorts of cases. How do you send people away who look at you as a court, well 
not a court, but as an office of last resort?”273 
Ordoñez’s failed experiment set in motion unfortunate feedback loops, with the CHR 
reverting to a strong emphasis on legal protection activities. In 2002, an estimated 63.5 percent 
of the CHR’s budget was allocated to such activities, with only 8.3 percent dedicated to 
“research, information and other human rights promotion activities.”274 Persistent concerns have 
surrounded investigation activities which threaten to jeopardize the independence of the 
Commission, with the focus falling on the violation itself, as opposed to the conduct of the 
enforcement agency.275 
As with the Malaysian case, NHRI leadership has continued to be highly consequential in 
shaping the fortunes of the office. Ordoñez was not reappointed in 1995. Under the leadership of 
Aurora Navarette-Reciña (1996–2002) and Purification C. Valera Quisumbing (2002-2008), the 
profile of the CHR plummeted. Navarette-Reciña, a judge and criminal litigator by training, was 
widely viewed as a “disastrous appointment.”276 Against a backdrop of massive human rights 
violations during the administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (2001–2010),277 the 
CHR once again disappeared from view.278 The fragile gains made under Ordoñez unravelled, 
with interagency cooperation breaking down and the CHR subject to severe budget cuts in 
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1997.279 No major CHR educational achievements are reported during the period 1997 to 
2007.280 
The appointment of a new CHR Chairperson in 2008 was met with disappointment by 
human rights NGOs.281 However, President Arroyo quickly lived to regret this decision.282 A 
former election lawyer with no human rights experience, Leila de Lima inspired little 
confidence. Under de Lima’s leadership the CHR once taunted as a “toothless tiger,” began to 
roar, “transformed into a high-profile watchdog.283 De Lima proved to be a formidable public 
advocate who quickly had the president “on the ropes.”284 Her leadership strategy represented a 
significant departure for the CHR, reflecting on her term as chair: 
 
Some have called me a controversial public figure. I will not and cannot deny. Back 
when I was the Chairperson of the Commission of Human Rights, public advocacy was 
our most effective and important weapon against the then prevailing culture of silence 
and impunity . . . .”285 
 
With de Lima’s actions described by observers as “courageous and impressive, probably 
unprecedented,”286 the CHR took up the mantle left by Ordoñez and began to actively pursue a 
promotional mandate. Indicative of CHR impact, one of the first acts of President Benigno 
Aquino III (2010–2016) was the signing of the Anti-Torture Act into law, accompanied by the 
new CHR Chair, Loretta Rosales (2010–2015). However, again, official support for human rights 
rapidly diminished. The CHR now faces its biggest test amidst the human rights crisis engulfing 
the country under President Rodrigo Duterte (2016–). Isolated within the political establishment, 
the CHR has been directly targeted by Duterte.287 The CHR budget was subsequently slashed by 
40 percent.288 In December 2016, the CHR bravely launched an investigation into “claims by 
President Rodrigo Duterte that he personally killed drug suspects while mayor in Davao,” 
making international headlines.289 
The qualified failure of the Philippine NHRI has been strongly informed by the relative 
lack of formal promotional powers. A formal legalist orientation set in motion a path trajectory 
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which marginalized the promotive function of the NHRI, which would have likely yielded more 
success. Ambiguity over a limited set of promotive powers has been compounded by poor 
leadership and a legalistic culture of practice. This case affirms the importance of certain types of 
promotional functions for securing institutionalization. In their absence, the CHR has failed to 
have the sustained national impact observed in the Malaysian case. However, similar to the 
Malaysia experience, individual leadership can make a difference. Individual CHR heads have, 
at different times, deviated from the norm and compelled powerful actors to respond to egregious 
human rights violations. Nevertheless, formal authority in key promotional areas provides an 
important safeguard for sustaining such efforts. In this case, formal authorization would have 
precluded the damaging Supreme Court challenge to CHR jurisdiction. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
NHRIs have emerged within the international human rights system as a possible missing 
link between ambitious international standards and highly uneven human rights practices on the 
ground. Propelled by UN promotional efforts and, more recently, novel treaty compliance 
arrangements, these national monitoring structures represent a transformation in the human rights 
landscape. NHRIs can now be found in over 120 countries, in every continent and sub-region of 
the world, and are common in both democratic and authoritarian regimes. Building on earlier 
work demonstrating the surprising diffusion and influence of the non-binding UN-endorsed 1991 
Paris Principles on NHRI institutional design,290 this article has examined when and why NHRIs 
are effective. The stakes are high, above all, for those who have suffered rights violations at the 
hands of government or security forces, yet find that they have little recourse to justice. 
An important prior quantitative study offers a measure of optimism; it concludes that 
countries that set up NHRIs perform better on critical physical integrity measures, such as 
freedom from torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and disappearance, than 
countries that lack NHRIs.291 However, qualitative case studies reveal surprising variation 
among NHRIs, praising some for robust, even heroic, protection efforts, while condemning other 
bodies as sham institutions.292  
This study is the first systematic assessment of the determinants of NHRI success or 
failure around the world. We collected fine-grained quantitative data on twenty-two formal 
institutional design features of all NHRIs around the world, focusing on four critical dimensions: 
independence safeguards, investigatory powers, promotion functions, and inclusiveness. We 
assessed NHRI effectiveness using both NHRI grades and our own original expert survey data. 
We combined this quantitative research with in-depth case studies of carefully matched country 
pairs. 
Broadly, our study demonstrates that formal institutional safeguards influence human 
rights outcomes, in part because formal institutional design remains relatively stable over time. 
Whereas governments can often resist NHRI advocacy by pulling on other levers—notably by 
manipulating personnel appointments and cutting budgets—they find it harder to change formal 
safeguards. In turn, formal safeguards structure the initial hiring and priorities of NHRIs, shape 
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modes of resistance, and contribute to the development of positive or negative feedback loops 
over time.  
Our study suggests that one institutional safeguard above all, the power to initiate, 
execute, and complete investigations on receipt of complaints, stands out as particularly 
important in enabling NHRI effectiveness, including in developing country settings displaying 
weak rule of law. Other design features strongly promoted by international NHRI templates, 
such as independence safeguards and broad promotional powers, may not correlate generally 
with more effective organizational outcomes across countries, but emerge as important under 
certain conditions, as evidenced in our case studies. More specifically, our case studies of 
Malaysia and the Philippines suggest that promotional powers can help an NHRI draw extensive 
publicity to human rights concerns. However, under inauspicious circumstances, and in the 
absence of other powers and safeguards, publicizing human rights concerns does not always 
suffice to prompt the executive to improve conditions on the ground, and can even lead to 
backlash. In the pages that follow, we outline the implications of our findings for major debates 
in the fields of administrative law, human rights, and international organization.  
 
A. Contributions to Administrative Law 
 
Should formal design occupy a privileged position in administrative law scholarship? 
Formal rules both constrain and enable independent agencies: they work both as a limit on 
permissible activities, and as a basis for justification of independent action. In the paragraphs that 
follow we present three mechanisms through which formal rules can influence outcomes, even in 
adverse circumstances, in which authoritarian regimes try to constrain independent agencies. 
First, we argue that formal rules have structured initial hiring and priority-setting, leading the 
NHRIs to emphasize some types of work over others, and perhaps limiting its own vision and 
ambition. Second, formal rules have shaped avenues of resistance to NHRI advocacy; opponents 
of the NHRI have been more likely to accede to NHRI efforts that clearly fall within its formal 
mandate, and more likely to challenge activities that are not clearly within the NHRI’s mandates. 
Third, formal rules contribute to the generation of positive (and negative) feedback cycles over 
time, leading some NHRIs to develop deep-rooted societal support, while others face criticism 
for their limited efforts. 
 
1. How formal rules structure initial hiring and priorities 
 
Formal rules can have a powerful impact upon organizational identity, informing the way 
in which personnel perceive their institutional mission, professional duties, and relationship to 
diverse constituencies. We observe that formal rules have exerted an influence over NHRI staff 
actions early on, by shaping the NHRI’s self-understanding of its role, its priorities, and its 
staffing needs. For example, in Peru, NHRI staff understood a broad complaint-handling 
mandate as enabling, whereas in Chile, NHRI staff understood a narrow complaint-handling 
mandate as a constraint.293 Whereas Peruvian officials were happy to accept a broad range of 
complaints, including for relatively small matters such as errors in water bill calculations, 
Chilean officials felt obliged to turn down many serious complaints that did not reach the torture 
threshold. This straightforward, if somewhat rigid, interpretation of a narrow legal mandate, 
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shows Chilean NHRI officials constraining themselves even before any opposition that they were 
overreaching could emerge. 
 While formal rules often demarcate limits and prescribe certain actions as required or 
impermissible, formal rules can also shape conduct within these limits by serving as guidelines 
for desirable behavior. Contrast the early years of the Malaysian NHRI, whose formal mandate 
included promotional powers, with the early years of the Philippine NHRI, whose formal 
mandate lacked many of these powers. In these early years, the Malaysian NHRI issued several 
hard-hitting reports that garnered very high publicity, while the Philippine NHRI defaulted into a 
low publicity strategy. They only hired one staff member with educational outreach expertise, 
instead focusing on hiring lawyers, guided in part by a formal mandate that explicitly granted the 
NHRI investigatory powers, but was silent on important promotional tasks. Because its guiding 
charter and leadership focused on prosecutions, not publicity, the Philippine NHRI remained 
relatively quiet in its early years, wasting a valuable window of opportunity in which Corazon 
Aquino emphasized human rights abuses perpetrated by her predecessor. 
 
2. How formal rules structure resistance strategies 
 
We argue that formal rules have also influenced the forms that resistance take to 
independent agencies tasked with holding government to account. Many formal NHRI 
safeguards focus on NHRI independence; when these are lacking, governments can undermine 
the entire NHRI structure. For instance, the Malaysian NHRI’s hard-hitting reports provoked 
widespread criticism from the government. In addition to criticizing individual reports, 
Malaysian leaders did not reappoint particularly troublesome commissioners, in part because this 
was permitted by the NHRI’s formal design—the unusually short two-year terms found in the 
Malaysian NHRI’s charter coupled with the authority of the prime minister to recommend 
members.294 However, notably, retaliatory action in this case would rebound against the 
government when a powerful coalition of NHRI supporters successively lobbied for term limits 
to be extended in 2008, as part of a significant structural reform package. 
Formal design features often place specific activities within an NHRI’s mandate. Absent 
explicit authorization, ambitious NHRI heads can see their efforts stymied when they act in ways 
that can be challenged as exceeding their mandate. For instance, the Philippine NHRI lacks a 
broad-ranging promotion mandate. When an enterprising commissioner started campaigns to 
fight the evictions of street vendors, the Supreme Court held that the NHRI had exceeded its 
mandate, and should instead “focus its attention to the more severe cases of human rights 
violations.”295 
 
3. How formal rules contribute to positive and negative feedback loops 
 
By shaping the choices of agency advocates and opponents from the earliest stages 
onward, formal rules contribute to the development of positive and negative feedback loops over 
time.296 Here we can contrast the broad complaint-handling powers granted to the Peruvian 
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NHRI with the much narrower powers granted to the Chilean NHRI. As the case study material 
shows, complaints started to trickle in early on to the Peruvian Ombudsman, but as they received 
some form of resolution, and considerable publicity, their annual volume grew dramatically, to 
over 130,000 in 2016. In addition, the NHRI received a lot of positive press coverage. As a 
result, an attempt by the political elite to capture the NHRI in 2013 was met with street protests 
from Peruvians who placed their trust in this one responsive institution.297  
In turn, not only was the Peruvian NHRI’s budget not cut, but it increased over time to 
accommodate its growing caseload, increasing from $4.4 million in 2000 to $18 million in 2016. 
In addition, the Peruvian NHRI has changed widespread attitudes toward the state. By offering 
access and redress to individual citizens and by publishing statistics on other parts of the 
government that were quick (or embarrassingly slow) to address citizen problems, the NHRI 
allowed Peruvians to envision the possibility of an accountable bureaucracy. That said, following 
the 2016 democratic elections, with Fujimori supporters effectively taking control of the 
legislature via a supermajority, the NHRI was dealt a significant blow with the appointment of an 
individual as ombudsman with alleged links to the political elite. In short: a robust formal 
mandate enhances, but does not guarantee, the prospects that an NHRI will build support and 
resist challenges over time.  
 Contrast the success of the Peruvian NHRI with the difficulties encountered by the 
Chilean NHRI. Because of its narrow mandate, the Chilean NHRI acted upon few complaints. 
This lack of action on complaints was then used by Chilean legislators as the basis to cut the 
NHRI’s budget; it was widely portrayed as either ineffectual or duplicating the function of other 
state agencies, and had struggled to build broad-based, plural domestic support. Indeed, even 
among expected supporters, such as human rights advocates, we observe resistance. Human 
rights observers highlight how the NHRI has been hamstrung by formal constraints, and have 
lobbied for the creation of competing bodies with complaint-handling powers—specialized 
bodies such as a children’s ombudsman. The INDH itself rejected its official designation as the 
National Preventive Mechanism under OPCAT in 2010 due to formal shortcomings. In short, 
initial formal mandates can end up having significant long-term effects on agency integrity and 
performance. 
 
B. Bringing Human Rights into Administrative Law Scholarship 
 
We also contribute to administrative law scholarship by highlighting the distinct 
operation of formal design in the human rights field. Unlike issue-areas such as public utilities, 
environmental, or antitrust regulation, that are generally modeled as games between three 
players—the state, the regulator, and the firm—human rights pose a different regulatory 
challenge. International human rights treaties often pit the interests of the authorizing principal 
(individual states and their officials) against the regulator (the NHRI). The risk of regulatory 
capture is thus particularly acute in the human rights field; we are not worried that a regulated 
industry will capture the regulator, but we are worried that the regulated executive and legislative 
branches will capture the regulator.298 To clarify: human rights violations are often perpetrated 
by the government itself, and are often authorized by top leaders in the state’s most powerful 
branches, including the executive, the police, and the military. Constraining an autocrat or a top 
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military commander might be even harder than the typical challenge outlined in the capture 
literature—i.e. limiting the influence of a politically powerful utility company, mining company, 
or pharmaceutical company. This study expands the substantive boundaries of administrative law 
to the human rights arena, to interrogate design effects in this regulatory setting, a setting that 
displays unusual delegation arrangements as well as high distributive and value conflict.299 
 
1. Implications for human rights scholarship 
 
In turn, the study extends the predominant focus in administrative law on advanced 
industrialized countries to assess what happens to supposedly stable assumptions surrounding 
formal effect when regulatory innovations travel to developing country settings. Our quantitative 
findings show that formal rules matter most in democratic settings, but also have some effects in 
authoritarian states. And our case studies elaborate on why formal rules still have some purchase 
even in transition states and under authoritarian conditions. 
This insight also bears on a lively debate in the human rights compliance literature.300 
Consistent with Simmons’s observation that treaty ratification has its largest effects in 
democratizing regimes as opposed to stable democracies or autocracies,301 we document high 
compliance effects, mediated by effective domestic mechanisms, in transitional settings. 
However, we add some nuance to understanding regime-specific treaty effects. First, we 
highlight variation in treaty effects via NHRI impact within transitional regime settings. This 
likely reflects the heightened sensitivity of domestic compliance mechanisms, as opposed to 
international instruments, to prevailing local institutional environments.302 Second, our Chilean 
case study suggests that treaty ratification may have limited effects in stable democratic settings, 
not only because the bar is already set high in terms of human rights protection, but because 
robust rule of law frameworks serve to mask isolated, but significant, human rights protection 
deficits, especially for vulnerable and marginalized groups within society Third, our findings 
highlight some significant, albeit circumscribed, openings for domestic treaty effects even under 
authoritarian conditions. However, it is important to note that our cases are not “stable 
autocracies.” As we have documented elsewhere, NHRIs established in dictatorships, such as 
Bahrain, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, are invariably governmental façade human rights bodies.303 
 
2. Implications for human rights practice 
 
This article also highlights the direct policy implications of human rights scholarship: 
explaining how specific institutional design safeguards have helped to empower NHRIs and 
constrain unchecked authoritarian governments’ abusive practices. In particular, we find that 
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while some formal design features operate differently across contexts, others, and especially 
investigative prerogatives, are important in a broad range of settings. This section highlights the 
effect of two specific safeguards in more depth: complaint-handling and promotion powers. 
We find very robust support for our conjecture that complaint-handling powers contribute 
to NHRI effectiveness in both democratic and authoritarian settings. As we outline in our theory, 
to date complaint-handling has been a controversial aspect of NHRI structures. Prominent critics 
worry that individual complaints can easily overwhelm small agencies, and direct their energies 
away from grave, systematic abuses toward small-bore problems of relatively well-positioned 
individuals. We find however, that complaint-handling is a very powerful tool, because it allows 
NHRIs to offer direct redress to individuals alleging violations and thus to make at least one part 
of the state accessible and responsive to its inhabitants. 
We also illustrate the ability of NHRIs to convert political capital derived from effective 
handling of individual complaints into a powerful base of public support. The importance of 
public support in the work of the NHRI echoes recent research on the ability of international 
judges to influence state behavior, spotlighting the importance of diffuse support among 
domestic and international interlocutors in subordinating powerful actors to the rule of law.304 
We also document positive feedback effects, including rising complaints serving as a 
justification for budget increases. These findings are compatible with other research that 
highlights the importance of complaint reception for torture prevention across sixteen country 
studies, especially when coupled with express authority to refer complaints to prosecutors.305  
In turn, the significance of promotional powers, especially for NHRIs operating in hostile 
settings, reinforces recent calls in the scholarship for a reappraisal of non-coercive managerial 
strategies of influence which might slowly yield important results over time.306 In the short term, 
promotional work can succeed in getting human rights issues onto the national agenda. However, 
this alone is only a first step: it is telling that the Malaysian NHRI, which has expansive 
promotional powers but few other safeguards, is often criticized for failing to turn major 
publicity into concrete policy reform.307 Nevertheless, establishing a gap between expectations 
and official practice may in itself prove beneficial to mobilization and efforts to force the 
government’s hand over time.  
These findings also have significant policy implications. The international standards 
governing NHRI design, the Paris Principles, strongly recommend that all NHRIs include 
promotional powers, but only weakly recommend complaint-handling.308 It is unlikely that the 
Paris Principles will be redrafted to include a recommendation that all NHRIs have complaint-
handling powers. This is because advocates worry that the reopening of negotiations on the Paris 
Principles could lead to a weakening of the document.309 Nevertheless, as we recommend below, 
the GANHRI SCA, the UN-affiliated NHRI peer review mechanism, offers an alternative route 
toward placing pressure on governments to maintain complaint-handling powers where NHRIs 
already exist, and build them into existing or soon to be established national institutions. 
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C. Contribution to Debates on International Organizations 
 
The question of NHRI organizational effectiveness also poses a direct challenge to the 
credibility of their principle supporter: the United Nations. The UN human rights apparatus finds 
itself embattled—at the mercy of obstructive member states, saddled with dwindling resources, 
and enjoying few effective policy tools to directly enforce human rights protections, especially 
where these are needed most.310 Persistent violating behavior by “false positives,” states that 
commit to UN treaties with no intention of complying, threaten to bring the entire system into 
disrepute.311 In response, the United Nations has sought to strengthen a diverse body of global 
administrative human rights law, exemplified by more intrusive norm frameworks, enhanced 
access to UN procedures, and the formal coordination of dedicated institutional mechanisms at 
the national level.312 NHRI promotion and strengthening forms a key plank of an ambitious UN 
strategy of compliance via orchestration.313 This development in global regulatory governance 
reflects an often underappreciated trend toward international organizations taking a lead in 
changing “the international sources of law, their substantive content, and the actors that make 
them, including states themselves.”314 
Against a challenging backdrop, the diffusion of NHRIs around the world marks a big 
success for the United Nations. Almost 120 countries now have NHRIs, and the vast majority of 
these closely follow the UN-sponsored Paris Principles.315 Moreover, the United Nations has 
begun building on the success of NHRIs by giving NHRIs formal speaking rights and 
incorporating them into treaty structures—notably as national preventive mechanisms under the 
OPCAT.316 The establishment of ex novo structures has also set in motion important design 
feedback effects, serving as a focal point for mobilizing compliance levels above an expected 
baseline, as witnessed in Malaysia with the upgrading of Suhakam’s structure in line with the 
Paris Principles in 2009. However, conversely, the influence of an international template may 
also have fueled a perverse “race to the middle,” with advocates for a more robust protective 
Chilean NHRI in line with the regional norm undermined by the basic NHRI model, as endorsed 
by the United Nations.317 Despite concerns about the (sub)optimality of the international 
template, the very fact that an Assembly resolution shaped the form of administrative agencies 
around the world is a major support for theories suggesting that the United Nations can wield 
important influence as a norm entrepreneur.  
At the same time, the ultimate test of United Nations’ influence does not concern the 
diffusion of NHRIs, but the diffusion of effective NHRIs. After all, a large literature in sociology 
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suggests that formal design is often decoupled from actual functions.318 By showing that formal 
design features are in fact connected to greater effectiveness, this study documents a particularly 
strong influence of the United Nations. Formal rules have provided NHRI practitioners and their 
supporters with a rare lever of influence over instituting structures at the national level, but as 
noted, adopting states retain significant prerogatives over the resulting NHRI form, as well as the 
individuals who populate the organization. 
The United Nations has few levers other than formal design recommendations to 
influence NHRI behavior—for instance, it cannot directly appoint NHRI staff members, or 
contribute significantly to NHRI financing. This greatly increases the importance of issuing the 
correct formal design recommendations.319 As our analysis shows, the formal design safeguards 
we studied are most closely linked with NHRI effectiveness in democratic states. This raises an 
important question for further research: is any formal design recommendation more likely to 
work in democratic settings, simply because these states tend to follow the rule of law more 
generally? Or are we basing our design safeguards too heavily on what works in industrialized 
countries, and a different set of safeguards would be more likely to work in developing country 
settings? 
Our study highlights one particular limitation of the UN-promoted Paris Principles—the 
de-prioritization of protective functions, and especially complaint-handling powers. How can one 
best ensure that the UN template is updated in light of current knowledge? Amending the Paris 
Principles seems unlikely; a large literature on international agreements suggests that these are 
quite sticky. While binding agreements can be particularly hard to modify, even amending a non-
binding agreement, such as the General Assembly resolution creating the Paris Principles, would 
require significant efforts to reach consensus among diverse UN members, and NHRI advocates 
worry that in the process, key recommendations might be watered down. However, another 
avenue for reform seems promising: the SCA, the peer review monitoring mechanism that grades 
NHRIs. Lacking a direct means to implement policy, the UN system has strongly promoted the 
role of the SCA as a third-party monitor of NHRI design integrity and performance. Delegation 
of monitoring duties to a third party can enhance compliance, especially where—as is the case of 
the SCA—a central body collects information from diverse sources and issues highly specific 
assessments in the form of letter grades to individual NHRIs.320 In recent years, the SCA has 
sought to ratchet up the specificity of the Paris Principles still further through authoritative 
interpretations.321 
A growing literature on indicators suggests that ranking mechanisms are very powerful 
levers, as they help focus the attention of key decision-makers as well as broader audiences.322 
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Indeed, we have seen such transformations before; as one Malaysian commissioner indicated, the 
threat of downgrade led the Malaysian government to greatly expand the NHRI’s powers. In his 
words, “[i]n hindsight, B stands for blessing in disguise.”323 More generally, it is not unusual to 
have human rights courts and committees interpret the meaning of foundational documents 
progressively, and in so doing maintain their continued relevance.324 
We therefore end our study on an optimistic note. In developing the Paris Principles, the 
UN General Assembly used its principle leverage tool—normative influence—with far more 
specificity than is typical. In so doing, it triggered global diffusion of administrative agencies 
with highly specific safeguards. Many of these safeguards, we have found, contribute to greater 
NHRI effectiveness around the world, even in hostile contexts. While formal safeguards are not, 
in themselves, sufficient to bring about change, they can be of significant help, by structuring 
initial hiring and priorities, by reshaping resistance, and by triggering positive feedback loops. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Simmons, Politics by Number: Indicators as Social Pressure in International Relations, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 55 
(2015). 
323 Tan Sri Hasmy Agam, Chairperson, Malaysian Human Rights Commission (Suhakam), Strengthening 
National Human Rights Institutions: The Paris Principles and the ICC Accreditation System, Presentation at the 
Geneva Side Event on Accreditation (Mar. 21, 2012); see also THOMAS PEGRAM, BRIDGING THE DIVIDE: THE 
MERGER OF THE IRISH EQUALITY AUTHORITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (2013), available at 
https://www.tcd.ie/policy-institute/assets/pdf/Studies_Policy_29_web.pdf. 
324 Laurence R. Helfer & Erik Voeten, International Courts as Agents of Legal Change: Evidence from LGBT 
Rights in Europe, 68 INT’L ORG. 77, 85 (2014). 
